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 In the first six months of the 2020s, marking the onset of the new decade, the COVID-19 
health crisis thrust every government in the world into an unprecedented policy predicament. 
This predicament became one of the most significant governance tests in the 21st century thus 
far, requiring government officials to craft and implement decisive policy responses in the face 
of complex and demanding political conundrums. Depending on their political system, some 
governments, like illiberal ones, had a far easier time imposing draconian policies upon their 
citizens. For these regimes, COVID-19 policy was a question of human life, regime stability, and 
economic endurance. Liberal democratic governments, however, faced a fourth factor making 
their COVID-19 policy decisions far more perplexing: civil liberties.  
 There are many democratic nations whose battles with coronavirus can yield fascinating 
conclusions for political science. Italy, however, stands out as an especially unique case. Italy 
and its people were the first western democratic nation to confront the pandemic in its most 
chaotic form—an unrestrained and un-mitigated outbreak. When coronavirus reached its 
inhabitants, it propelled Italy's central and regional governments onto the pandemic's front lines 
with the only clue for policy solutions coming from the World Health Organization and un-
democratic nations such as China and Iran. Due to the nation’s decentralized health system, the 
virus's sudden arrival forced regional governments to aptly formulate and implement public 
policies that had no guarantee of pacifying the deadly contagion. Italian elected officials were the 
first to face the difficult question that every democratically elected official would soon 
encounter; "how can I control a highly-contagious virus while simultaneously respecting the 
rights of my constituents?" As if fate drew its name from a hat, Italy found itself center-stage of 
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the crisis, with the Italian people and the rest of the world watching in hushed silence to see how 
policymakers responded.  
Italy’s first wave lasted from mid-February to the end of July, claiming 35,000 total 
lives.1 Interestingly, the entire nation did not suffer equally. Compared to other regions, Italy's 
industrialized and affluent northern regions were disproportionately devastated by the virus. By 
the end of the wave, the northern Lombardy region's population contracted 40% of COVID-19 
cases, and the populations across three other northern regions contracted another 33% of cases.2 
The remaining COVID-19 cases were dispersed evenly throughout the rest of Italy. With the 
violent influx of cases in the North, COVID-19 patients overwhelmed regional healthcare 
systems, which was especially the case for Lombardy.3 While northern regions struggled to 
control the virus’s speed, in Italy’s southern regions, which lack reliable healthcare 
infrastructures, COVID-19’s health impact fortunately was far less devastating.4  
But despite the highly localized consequences of Italy’s first COVID-19 wave, many 
regional institutions across the nation adopted their own particular policy approaches to the 
crisis. For instance, when Lombardy health officials first detected an outbreak within their 
wealthy region, numerous northern Governors tried downplaying the intensifying crisis.5 On the 
other side of the country, the Governors in the South preemptively closed schools and barred 
public gatherings before the central government finally issued a nationwide lockdown decree on 
March 9th, more than two weeks after Lombardy health officials discovered the COVID 
 
1 Guglielmi et al., “Public Acceptability of Containment Measures during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy,” 4. 
2 Guglielmi et al., 4. 
3 Horowitz, “For Southern Italy, the Coronavirus Becomes a War on 2 Fronts.” 
4 Horowitz. 
5 Review, “Exporting the Italian Model to Fight COVID-19 | The Regulatory Review.” 
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outbreak.6 The factors that led to these different policy approaches have yet to be identified and 
analyzed. 
Since 1970, Italian regional governments have been responsible for health and hospital 
services, urban affairs, and economic development, meaning that each regional government tried 
directly addressing the COVID crisis within their territories before the central government 
intervened. Italy’s decentralized sub-national governance system suggests that it may be 
interesting to investigate how regional governments responded to the health crisis's challenges. 
The COVID crisis has extraordinary political significance because it has tested sub-national 
institutions' capabilities in being decisive, efficient, and cooperative. The crisis represents one of 
Italy's most significant public policy challenges since World War II. It is essential to understand 
how these regional governments performed and why they chose the policy paths they did.   
One fascinating approach to this topic is through the lens of social capital theory. The 
renowned political scientist Robert Putnam pioneered social capital in his 1993 book Making 
Democracy Work.  Using Italy’s regional governments as the center of his study, Putnam created 
the social capital concept to explain how a thriving democratic civil society can make 
governments more effective and responsive to their citizens. Since social capital’s debut, 
scholars have rigorously searched for new and innovative ways to understand the complex 
relationship between social capital and effective democratic institutions.  
The unprecedented COVID-19 crisis introduces an unparalleled opportunity to 
investigate social capital in a new and unique light. In this study, any trends in the region’s 
responses to COVID-19 can be insightful in furthering our understanding of the critical 




national institutions in the virus-stricken North adopted different health-related measures than 
those in the poor and economically depressed South, and social capital may help explain these 
differing approaches. The timing and quality of the regional authorities’ responses to the crisis 
can help us understand how social capital may shape functioning under extreme pressure.  
By investigating the various roles Italian regional governments played during the first 
wave of the 2020 pandemic, this thesis will look to deepen our knowledge of Robert Putnam’s 
social capital theory. Though Putnam argues that social capital contributes to good governance, 
its effects may be different in a public health crisis. For instance, were institutions in areas with 
historically low social capital able to more quickly enact strict lockdown and social distancing 
mandates? Were institutions in areas with historically high social capital more hesitant to enact 
COVID-19 policies restricting their citizens’ rights? While these are intriguing questions, 
alternative variables may have also played roles in government policy approaches. Partisanship, 
the average population age, population density, and healthcare system conditions are all 
necessary to consider as explanatory variables in the event of inter-regional differences.  
Research Question and Findings 
Therefore, this thesis will ask, how did social capital shape Italian regional governments’ 
policy responses to the pandemic and their overall efficacy? Faced with this question, scholars 
would likely hypothesize that since social capital can foster general institutional competence, 
high social capital levels would consistently facilitate effective governance and policies during 
the COVID-19 crisis. Furthermore, scholars might also assume that low social capital levels 
would hinder policymaking and effective governance. Drawing on a four-region comparative 
case study, my findings depart from these initial hypotheses. Examining Lombardy and Veneto, 
two regions with high social capital levels, and Campania and Calabria, two regions with low 
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social capital levels, I find that social capital did not fully determine policies. However, as 
regional governments formulated their policy solutions to the pandemic, social capital was an 
underlying factor shaping their decision-making. Furthermore, when they successfully adjusted 
their policies to accommodate for their region’s social capital, these policies were more effective. 
This claim suggests that during a crisis, high social capital does not guarantee effective 
governance, and low social capital does always produce ineffective governance.  
 This comparative case study yields some interesting findings for social capital and its 
influence on governments when they are faced with an extraordinary emergency. While this 
study suggests that social capital levels can influence policies and their effectiveness, it is 
important to clarify that social capital does not fully determine policy responses. Rather, social 
capital appears to have had an underlying influence on regional governments’ policy approaches 
to address the COVID-19 outbreak. Moreover, when these policy approaches took advantage the 
civic community’s strengths, or addressed the un-civic community’s weaknesses, then these 
policy responses were more effective in combatting the virus. 
 In high social capital regions, the civic community can play two noteworthy roles in 
influencing crisis policy approaches and efficacy. First, as Lombardy’s case suggests, the civic 
community can create a barrier to decisive policy responses by intimidating policymakers, 
reminding them that they will be held accountable for any costly errors. On the other hand, 
Veneto’s case suggests that when the government overcomes this intimidation and enacts a 
policy response, the civic community’s ability to overcome collective action dilemmas can serve 
as a valuable tool in facilitating policy success. In low social capital areas, the lack of a civic 
community can play a fascinating role in crisis policy approaches. As seen in both Campania’s 
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and Calabria’s cases, the community’s scarcity of trust and collective capabilities can permit 
governments to take assertive and aggressive measures to promote pandemic containment.  
Alternative Hypotheses 
This thesis will also consider alternative hypotheses to identify other potential influences 
on regional government policy responses. The first alternative hypothesis (AH1) is that Italian 
regions containing older and densely settled populations had governments that responded 
aggressively to the virus. The second alternative hypothesis (AH2) claims that the assertiveness 
of Italian regional government policy approaches depended upon the strength of the region’s 
healthcare systems. Finally, the third alternative hypothesis (AH3) claims that regions with 
comparatively high support for right-wing political parties contained governments that responded 
slowly to the virus. By examining these hypotheses, it will be possible to further identify the 
priorities held by elected officials when they created their COVID-19 policies. These priorities 
will help further reveal what democratic sub-national governments consider to be important in 
times of extreme crisis.  
Literature Review 
 The following scholarly arguments provide crucial context to this empirical investigation 
of how Robert Putnam’s social capital theory can help explain policy approaches and efficacy in 
responding to COVID-19. Since its introduction into political science, scholars have widely 
praised social capital for its contribution to democratic thought. The theory has also received 
criticism. Furthermore, political scientists have analyzed Putnam’s social capital theory in nearly 
every political scenario, with the most relevant to this study being natural disaster responses. 
Furthermore, in the crisis’s aftermath, scholars have already begun to study the pandemic’s 
effect on Italy’s state and society relationships. Therefore, this section will be divided into four 
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sub-sections. The first describes the theory of social capital and its fundamental assumptions. 
The next sub-section addresses the prominent theoretical critiques of social capital theory. The 
third demonstrates how the theory has been applied and subdivided to explain institutional 
responses to natural disaster crises. The final sub-section will disclose two noteworthy studies 
that have investigated institutional confidence and trust during the first wave of COVID-19 in 
Italy.  
Social Capital and Foundations 
 The assumptions of Robert Putnam’s social capital are inspired by Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s classic Democracy in America. In his investigation of American democracy, de 
Tocqueville coins the term “civil society” when he observes that “Americans of all ages, all 
conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations.”7 He concludes that with an 
abundance of associations in a thriving civil society, Americans can efficiently collectivize and 
mobilize their communities to pursue shared desires and hold elected officials accountable for 
their governance. A democratic civil society gives political power to the people, thus replacing 
monarchs' absolute power and ensuring that politicians and institutions are responsive to their 
constituents. Robert Putnam relies heavily upon Tocquevillian philosophy when formulating his 
social capital theory.   
 Originally developed by sociologists trying to explain how social ties within families and 
communities affect cognitive development, social capital was linked to political science by 
Robert Putnam et al. in Making Democracy Work.8 In what was deemed by one source as “the 
most important work of social science since Pareto and Max Weber,” Putnam and his team 
 
7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Delba Winthrop, “Democracy in America,” New England Review 
(1990-) 21, no. 3 (2000): 129. 
8 Tarrow, “Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time,” 922. 
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attempted to explain the vast discrepancies of institutional effectiveness between northern and 
southern Italian regional governments. To tackle this complex subject, Putnam et al. created a 
cross-section analysis of the young Italian sub-national governments.9 Using quantitative data 
collected from twenty regional institutions and qualitative historical analysis of the contrasting 
regional histories, they theorized that the degree of social capital present in a community could 
explain institutional effectiveness and socioeconomic development.10  
Like other forms of capital, social capital can be accumulated or lost over an extended 
period of time. Social capital is not built just by individuals but by communities as a whole. 
Communities build social capital from two sources; norms of reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement.11 When community members develop norms of reciprocity, the members can rely 
on each other to follow norms for acceptable behavior. When individuals follow a norm, they do 
so out of an expectation that their community will adhere to the same norm in the future. The 
expectation for social compensation is why this is more than a norm alone; it is a norm of 
reciprocity. On the other hand, when an individual disobeys a norm, the violator forfeits the 
community's future benefit and will be shunned as punishment for their deviance. A generalized 
network of trust and social exchange between community members is vital for these norms to 
blossom. One example of this norm of reciprocity provided by Putnam occurs in his 
neighborhood during the fall season. There is an unwritten norm in his neighborhood that when 
leaves from someone’s tree fall on another neighbor’s lawn, then the person whose property 
contains the tree is responsible for raking the tree’s leaves. This norm is generated not by 
legislators or schoolteachers but by community members who mention it to new neighbors, 
 
9 Tarrow, 922. 
10 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, 114. 
11 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 171. 
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discuss it in their communal conversations, and persistently rake their own yards.12 When leaves 
from his tree fall on another neighbor’s yard, Putnam rakes these leaves because he knows his 
neighbors would do the same for him, and if he does not rake the leaves, he risks being shunned 
from neighborhood events and losing the norm’s future benefits.13  
Like norms of generalized reciprocity, networks of civic engagement are also needed for 
social capital to accumulate over time. At first, it might seem surprising that an abundance of 
non-political civil organizations like choral societies and sports clubs can produce social capital 
effective governance, and socioeconomic development. These civic organizations, however, 
have many positive impacts on communities. First, networks of civic engagement help establish 
norms of reciprocity by increasing social interactions and reinforcing the community’s 
expectations of acceptable behavior.14 In turn, civic organizations raise the community cost of 
defecting from these norms, which leads to less opportunism and exploitation. Third, networks of 
civic engagement increase the flow of information throughout a community, which results in 
more mutual trust, cooperation, and collaboration. Finally, the past successes in collaboration 
facilitated by civic networks provide a “template for future collaboration,” making community 
mobilization a ritualistically simple task.15 When norms of generalized reciprocity combine with 
dense networks of civic engagement, communities are more capable of curbing deceit and 
opportunism. They are also more likely to solve collective action dilemmas consistently.16 
A collective action dilemma arises when an endeavor requires widespread community 
participation for it to be successful. An excellent example of this endeavor is a protest, or in this 
 
12 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 171. 
13 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 171. 
14 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 173. 
15 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 174. 
16 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 172. 
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study’s case, a COVID-19 lockdown and a community-based testing and tracing program. When 
facing this collective endeavor, individual citizens must be inclined to participate. In cases where 
rational citizens examine the endeavor through a cost-benefit perspective, they might choose to 
abstain from participating, forgoing any risks while receiving any benefits if the endeavor 
succeeds without them. If every citizen chooses this seemingly rational approach, then every 
endeavor requiring collective action will fail. For a community to overcome collective action 
dilemmas, they must trust that their peers will participate and mobilize alongside them rather 
than selfishly staying home. Putnam finds that social capital’s norms of generalized reciprocity 
and civic engagement networks are valuable tools in mobilizing communities and conquering 
these collective action problems.  
Once Putnam formulates the two social capital sources, he creates the civic community 
and correlates high social capital levels to this civic community, resulting in highly effective 
government institutions. Like de Tocqueville’s civil society, Putnam believes that civic 
communities have high civic engagement levels, as measured, for example, by referenda voter 
turnout and media consumption. A civic community also contains numerous associational 
structures, which Putnam measures using the number and density of civic associations. Putnam 
claims that highly civic societies spawn effective institutions because they facilitate greater 
public engagement in politics, making citizens hold their governments to higher standards. As a 
result of this high expectation, politicians in these civic communities are more attentive to their 
constituents' needs. Also, citizens in a civic community develop attitudes of mutual trust, 
openness, and adherence to the rule of law. They have mutual respect for their peers and 
politicians, and they organize themselves with their politicians on a horizontal plane based on 
equality. These characteristics lead to the emergence of competent and capable institutions. 
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Putnam also finds that citizens lack a collective sense of honesty, solidarity, and discipline in 
areas with low social capital levels and un-civic communities. Without social capital, individuals 
are constantly suspicious of their community members and government officials. This suspicion 
results in citizens opposing their politicians, disobeying laws, and forcing them to engage in 
exploitative clientelism inside vertical hierarchies. These vertical hierarchies manifest within 
associations and citizen-government relationships. In this theoretical context, the policies and 
effectiveness of regional institutions in Italy during the COVID-19 pandemic can shed light on 
how social capital influences public policy's course, content, and success during times of extreme 
crisis. 
After conducting his quantitative study of the twenty regions in Italy and thoroughly 
conceptualizing the civic community and social capital, Putnam consistently finds that the 
traditional and pre-industrial regions of the South contain the lowest levels of social capital. In 
contrast, the modernized and wealthy regions of the North contain the highest levels. 
Consequently, local and regional institutions in the North are far more effective than those in the 
South. Furthermore, he observed that while northern institutions are more focused on political 
relationships with the central government, the southern institutions are focused on their fiscal 
relationships with Rome. Putnam also produces a qualitative study of the historical civic 
traditions of northern versus southern Italy. Since the middle ages, northern Italy contained a far 
more extensive civic engagement network with a horizontal relation to their governing 
institutions. On the other hand, in southern Italy, a longstanding patriarchal rule normalized 
clientelist and vertical relationships. Putnam concluded that social capital develops slowly, and 
historical traditions play a significant role in the contemporary presence of social capital within a 
community. In the aftermath of social capital’s study, institutions such as the World Bank have 
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designated social capital as the “missing link” to development.17 It is the political variable that 
helps political scientists understand how societies improve their institutions' effectiveness and, 
ultimately, their community’s socioeconomic well-being.  
Criticism 
While it is an extraordinarily comprehensive and fruitful theory, social capital has also 
been the target of theoretical criticism. The criticism of social capital comes from Levi, Boix and 
Posner, Tavits, Navarro, Barcelo, Lijhpart, Solt, and Tarrow. These theoretical perspectives are 
essential to recognize because they introduce alternative variables that could have impacted sub-
national institutions, and social capital cannot entirely explain COVID-19 policy responses. All 
critical material is provided to enhance the general understanding of social capital and the 
broader dynamics of the state and society relationship. These are not intended to completely 
negate social capital or render it obsolete. Instead, the following critiques serve as a reminder 
that social capital is not the sole explanatory variable for regional government responses to the 
COVID crisis.  
Critiques of social capital reveal the theory’s limitations and flaws. Levi, Boix and 
Posner, and Tavits all believe that social capital's base assumptions require scrutiny. First, 
Margaret Levi (1996) investigates the connection between individual associational membership 
and widespread trust. She asserts that while Putnam claims a link between civic membership and 
trust, he does not mention the exact mechanism that creates this link and what he truly means by 
“trust.”18 Putnam believes that citizens and policymakers trust one another in civic communities, 
 
17 John Harriss and Paolo De Renzio, “POLICY ARENA: ‘Missing Link’ or Analytically Missing?: The Concept of 
Social Capital. Edited by John Harriss. An Introductory Bibliographic Essay,” Journal of International Development 
9, no. 7 (1997): 930. 
18 Margaret Levi, “Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work,” 
Politics & Society 24, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 46. 
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seeing themselves as equals on a horizontal plane. But citing the Italian Mafia as an example, 
Levi argues that citizens can acquire vigorous trust in vertical networks. Furthermore, state 
institutions can create mutual trust just as effectively as networks of association. This critique 
implies that social capital may not be exclusive to highly civic communities but can prosper in 
communities where vertical and hierarchical relationships are present. 
Carles Boix and Daniel Posner’s paper (1996) Making Social Capital Work claims that 
social capital theory is somewhat underdeveloped. They contend that one cannot simply judge 
institutional effectiveness by examining the community’s social capital level. Instead, Boix and 
Posner insist that specific civic associations contribute more to social capital and community 
civicness than others.19 Since many associations have different purposes, it would be wrong to 
assume that all associations equally contribute to social capital within a civic community. For 
example, anti-democratic associations like the Ku Klux Klan will undermine trust within a 
community.  
Another significant critique of social capital comes from Margit Tavits (2006). In her 
article “Making Democracy Work More? Explaining the Linkage between Social Capital and 
Government Performance,” Tavits refutes Putnam’s claim that social capital can make 
democratic institutions more effective. Instead, Tavits argues that rather than predicting 
government performance, social capital is better in assessing political activism levels. This 
assertion diverts attention from social capital’s cultural determinism and shifts the focus towards 
the broader political activism variable.20 This criticism implies that institutional effectiveness in 
COVID-19 responses may correlate with higher political activism levels within regions. 
 
19 Boix and Posner, “Making Social Capital Work: A Review of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy,” (1996): 8. 
20 Tavits, “Making Democracy Work More?,” 224. 
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Much of Putnam’s criticism focuses on his underestimation of alternative variables that 
can have notable impacts on institutional effectiveness. Navarro, Barcelo, Lijhpart, Solt, and 
Tarrow attempt to identify these intervening variables. Their respective scholarship adds 
insightful details to the complicated picture of what influences institutional effectiveness. One 
particular variable is popular mobilization led by political parties. Vicente Navarro (2002) 
suggests that in crediting northern institutions for their exceptional governance, Putnam ignores 
the important collectivizing role that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its ideology of 
solidarity played in fostering social capital. By neglecting the social change that the Communist 
Party carried out in northern Italy, Navarro insists that Putnam overlooked the unifying power of 
political mobilizations.21 Joan Barcelo (2014) makes a similar argument by pointing out a 
correlation between PCI electoral support and social capital in northern Italy.22 Both authors’ 
arguments build on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of civic associations that claims that a vibrant civil 
society will only benefit democracy when the associations form to combat capitalism.23  
Frederick Solt (2004) adopts a similar line of criticism undertaken by Arendt Lijhpart 
(1996). Solt based his argument around Lijhpart’s 1996 presidential address to the Political 
Science Association. In his address, Lijhpart claimed that as voter turnout and political 
participation rise, responsiveness from elected officials would increase, yielding a better 
democracy.24  Like Lijhpart, Solt suggests that a better predictor of effective democratic 
institutions derives from self-motivated political participation. Furthermore, Solt believes that 
political participation is dependent on levels of economic development and the region’s historical 
 
21 Vicente Navarro, “A Critique of Social Capital,” International Journal of Health Services 32, no. 3 (2002): 428. 
22 Joan Barceló, “Re-Examining a Modern Classic: Does Putnam’s Making Democracy Work Suffer from 
Spuriousness?,” Modern Italy 19, no. 4 (November 2014): 469. 
23 Barceló, 461. 
24 Lijphart, “Unequal Participation,” 3. 
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importance of landholding.25 The variable of political activism is undeniably important, but as 
Putnam noted, clientelism can intrude on voter preferences, consequently undermining the 
essence of democracy. This hidden ulterior motive means that political scientists must approach 
the political participation variable with a grain of salt.  
Sidney Tarrow (1996) offers the final intervening variables. Tarrow praises social 
capital’s determinative capabilities, but he also advocates that other causes for institutional 
effectiveness can lie in structural deficiencies such as exploitative governments, lack of 
economic capital, and unstable public good prices.26 These variables are a stark reminder that 
social capital may not provide the sole or comprehensive explanation of regional institution 
effectiveness during the COVID-19 pandemic. By acknowledging the theoretical limitations of 
social capital suggested by these authors, this study can carefully apply Putnam’s theory of social 
capital to the coronavirus crisis.  
Social Capital During Natural Disasters 
 The most relevant scholarly literature on social capital for this thesis derives from 
investigations into institutional responses following natural disasters. While they are different 
from one another, both natural disasters and pandemics require decisive governmental responses. 
The similar role of policymakers is why these two crises can share a similar light. The natural 
disaster stream of scholarship has primarily applied social capital in the form of its different 
types. First introduced by Michael Woolcock (1998), these types are; bonding, bridging, and 
linking social capital.27 Bonding social capital represents close, horizontal civic connections 
among homogenous individuals like ethnic groups and families. Bonding social capital alone is 
 
25 Solt, “Civics or Structure?” 126 
26 Tarrow, “Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time,” 391. 
27 Woolcock, “Social Capital and Economic Development,” 154. 
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not sufficient to produce effective governance. Bridging social capital incorporates more vertical 
and limited connections among members of different socioeconomic classes. Finally, linking 
social capital identifies the hierarchical relations between communities and politicians serving in 
institutions. When these three social capital forms are combined, then effective governance and 
socioeconomic development can follow. These subdivisions are especially important to address 
because in many of Italy’s southern regions, including Campania and Calabria, bonding social 
capital is prevalent. These regions contain dense family networks of organized crime, and while 
this does indicate the presence of bonding social capital, these networks cannot contribute to 
effective governance. Therefore, the overall social capital levels in the southern regions remain 
insubstantial.  
The sparse research into social capital’s effects during natural disaster crises begins with 
Yuko Nakagawa and Rajib Shaw (2004). To identify how social capital affects post-natural 
disaster recovery rates, the authors create a comparative case study of institutional responses to 
earthquakes in the Indian city of Bhuj and the Japanese city of Kobe. They discover that the 
higher the linking social capital level, indicating a closer tie between a community and its 
government, the faster the city’s recovery and rehabilitation occurs.28 However, not only is 
linking social capital required for an institution’s effective disaster response, strong community 
and political leaders play a significant role as well. Meanwhile, the other two types of social 
capital, bonding, and bridging are irrelevant when a community faces irreversible natural disaster 
damage.  
Oliver Rubin (2016) also explores the connection between social capital and natural 
disaster responses, but he dissents from Nakagawa and Shaw’s emphasis on the linking 
 
28 Yuko Nakagawa and Rajib Shaw, “Social Capital and Disaster Recovery: A Comparative Case Study of Kobe and 
Gujarat Earthquake,” (2004): 3. 
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subdivision of social capital.29 Rubin admits that linking social capital is significant for 
communities in natural disasters, but he posits that political survival theory is more determinative 
of institutional effectiveness. Political survival theory assumes that in-state actors will do 
whatever possible to maximize rents and time in office, and natural disaster crises pose 
significant political threats. In democratic nations, these threats are more intense.30 This drive for 
political survival means that institutions' actions in the aftermath of natural disasters have 
distinctive political motivations behind them. While the COVID-19 pandemic may have notable 
differences to natural disasters, both kinds of crises force sub-national governments to mobilize, 
and the scholarly contributions of Nakagawa, Shaw, and Rubin provide a solid foundation upon 
which this thesis can build. 
Institutional Confidence and Community Trust during Italy’s First Wave of COVID-19 
 In the months after Italy’s first battle with COVID-19, political scientists and 
psychologists have already begun to ask interesting questions about how the nation’s government 
and people handled the crisis. Two pieces indirectly related to social capital have arisen from 
these preliminary reports, the first concerning institutional confidence and the second concerning 
trust. Since trust facilitates social capital, and social capital spawns institutional confidence, 
these two reports provide valuable insight into the state and society relationships during the first 
Italian wave of coronavirus.  
The first relevant report comes from Falcone et al. (2020), who investigate the 
importance of community and governmental trust during pandemic situations and use Italy’s first 
wave as their case study. Viewing the pandemic through a psychological lens, Falcone et. al 
 
29 Rubin, “The Political Dimension of ‘Linking Social Capital,’” 432. 
30 Rubin, 440. 
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hypothesize that trust is an essential component for communities during pandemic situations. For 
communities to survive pandemics, their trust must not only lie within the community, it must 
also be shared with the government.31 Italy has a protracted history of institutional mistrust, so 
when the COVID-19 crisis arrived, it would have been accurate to assume the nation was at a 
significant disadvantage. However, after administering a nationwide survey, Falcone et al. 
discover that at the beginning of the crisis, the nation’s long trend of institutional mistrust 
suddenly reversed in what the authors characterize as a “trust boom.”32 This trust boom, which 
occurred everywhere in Italy, was not the product of a “collective epiphany” regarding the 
quality of governance.33 Instead, the authors believe the phenomenon occurred due to a 
widespread cognitive realignment to accommodate for the new pandemic’s reality. Now that the 
pandemic was threatening them, Italians realized that in order to survive, they needed to rely on 
their public institutions for guidance, and this reliance is the source of the trust boom.34 The 
central government received the vast majority of trust resulting from this cognitive shift.35 As 
Chapter Three’s empirical analysis will clarify on this point, this newfound trust in Rome, 
coupled with Rome’s poor public messaging, created significant problems for regional 
governments trying to persuade their citizens to take the virus seriously.  
Also using Italy’s first wave of coronavirus, Guglielmi et al. (2020) attempt to explain the 
complex relationships between institutional confidence and community adherence to COVID-19 
policy directives. In their findings, the authors discover a similar trend as Falcone et al. where 
the majority of institutional confidence is directed towards the central government over the 
 
31 Falcone et al., “All We Need Is Trust,” 1. 
32 Falcone et al., 13. 
33 Falcone et al., 14. 
34 Falcone et al., 14. 
35 Falcone et al., 12. 
 19 
regional governments. They also discover that institutional confidence is positively associated 
with policy compliance, a correlation they call the “cascade of confidence.”36 This cascade of 
confidence is crucial for promoting policy compliance, but when institutions quarrel with one 
another, institutional confidence is weakened, the cascade of confidence falls, and policies are 
adhered to less.37 To maintain the cascade of confidence, institutions must have clear and united 
public messaging agendas supporting the benefits of policy adherence.38 The authors also 
discover a phenomenon called the “paradox of support,” where the perception of safety from 
COVID-19 decreases adherence to restrictive directives.39 Both of these concepts are helpful in 
understanding the shifting dynamics between the institutions and their citizens.  
Methodology 
To substantiate this thesis’s argument and judge the veracity of the alternative 
hypotheses, this analysis will be comprised of a qualitative and quantitative comparative case 
study of two northern regions, Lombardy and Veneto, and two southern regions, Campania and 
Calabria. The unit of analysis has been placed on the regional level for a variety of reasons. First, 
in federal political systems such as Italy’s, pandemics and all health-related crises, are directly 
combatted at the sub-national level. While the federal government can offer broad oversight and 
resources like federal funds and personal protective equipment, sub-national governments are 
initially responsible for formulating and implementing pandemic public policies. Even though 
the central government eventually imposed a national lockdown to supersede regional policies, 
regional governments were the first responders to the crisis. The second reason for this regional 
unit of analysis regards data availability. Local government data is significantly more difficult to 
 
36 Guglielmi et al., “Public Acceptability of Containment Measures during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy,” 5. 
37 Guglielmi et al., 9. 
38 Guglielmi et al., 9. 
39 Guglielmi et al., 9. 
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gather and can lack reliability, a problem especially relevant for regions of poor governance and 
socioeconomic capacity like Calabria. The third reason for this study’s unit of analysis is 
horizontal case comparability. By choosing to study Italian regions, it is possible to accurately 
compare regional performances on an even horizontal plane. Of course, some regional 
institutions had economic advantages over others; for instance, the Veneto regional 
government’s capacity for expensive contact-tracing programs was far greater than Calabria’s. In 
addition to this disparity, the virus’s ramification was heavily localized in northern Italy rather 
than southern Italy. These discrepancies will be carefully addressed and factored into the final 
evaluation of each regional government’s performance and the potential influences of the 
region’s social capital level. Finally, by choosing to conduct this study at the regional level, it is 
possible to meticulously review the role social capital played in determining governmental 
responses to the COVID-19 crisis. 
To successfully understand social capital’s effects on policymaking during a crisis, four 
regions will be analyzed; two from the North containing high social capital and two from the 
South containing low social capital. For regions to take part in this case study, they must fulfill 
two fundamental criteria. First, for the selected region to honestly speak for the governmental 
effects of high or low social capital, their communities must genuinely contain that social capital 
level. To accurately determine a region’s social capital, this assessment will follow Putnam’s 
lead by evaluating the prospective region’s four indicators of a highly civic community; 
association density, national referendum electoral turnout, newspaper readership, and preference 
voting levels. First, to identify associational structure density and the “vibrancy of associational 
life,” data will be gathered on the number of community associations that form the region’s civil 
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societies.40 This data will be found in primary sources and online census records taken by both 
the Italian central government and the regional governments. The second, third, and fourth social 
capital indicators will measure the region’s civic engagement with politics and their government. 
Two of these indicators, national referendum electoral turnout and newspaper readership levels, 
will be identified using primary data sources provided by the Italian National Institute of 
Statistics. The final civic community indicator, preference voting levels, will originate from a 
secondary source; the research conducted by a preference voting scholar.  
Once the selected region's social capital levels have been determined as high or low, the 
second criterion will be examined. To compare each region’s government response to the first 
wave of COVID-19, it must be established that each region was threatened by the virus at the 
beginning of the crisis. This threat would imply that their governments had sufficient reasons to 
take policy action. If a regional government had no justifiable reason to fear the crisis, the policy 
inaction resulting from this legitimate indifference would skew this study's results. As long as 
each of the selected regions can reasonably represent their ends social capital, and their 
governments had a logical reason to formulate policy to combat the COVID-19 outbreak, these 
regions are acceptable for analysis. After thoroughly screening Italy’s twenty regions, the regions 
fulfilling these criteria to the highest degree are the two northern regions of Lombardy and 
Veneto, and two southern regions, Campania and Calabria. Lombardy and Veneto will represent 
the effects of high social capital, while Campania and Calabria will represent the absence of 
social capital. 
Next, to investigate a regional government’s experience with the COVID-19 crisis, this 
study will use primary sources such as political elite discourse and government decrees, as well 
 
40 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, 91. 
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secondary sources such as academic papers and media articles. To gain further insight into 
regional policy approaches, research will be supplemented by virtual interviews with community 
figures such as regional government politicians and health officials. All of this research will be 
gathered to serve a variety of purposes. First, in Chapter Three, research will be used to create a 
detailed timeline depicting the virus’s onset in Italy. Second, after the crisis's general timeline is 
explained, each of the selected regional governments’ policy approaches and responses will be 
disclosed and analyzed. This analysis will be used to determine any conclusions concerning the 
relationship between social capital and coronavirus governance. These conclusions may help 
contribute to the understanding of how social capital can be relevant during extreme crises 
similar to the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, in Chapter Four, all research and conclusions will 
be consolidated to assess the accuracy of the hypotheses.  
Chapter Outline 
This thesis is centered upon the argument that social capital played an underlying role in 
regional government policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, and when these governments 
implemented policy solutions that accommodated for their region’s social capital level, then 
these policies were consistently more effective in defending the population. To make this 
argument clear and precise, this study has been divided into four chapters. This chapter has 
served as an introduction, investigating the past scholarship on Putnam’s social capital theory 
and how it needs examination in times of significant crisis. In the following chapter, I will 
introduce and justify the four-case comparison. Once the regions’ social capital levels are 
examined, I will confirm that each regional government had significant motivation to formulate 
COVID-19 policies at the beginning of the crisis.  
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Divided into two parts, Chapter Three will serve as this study’s primary empirical 
analysis. The first half of the analysis will include the general timeline of COVID-19. In the 
second section the potential roles of social capital will be revealed through an analysis of each 
selected region’s policy response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Starting with the regions 
representing high social capital and working down to the regions representing low social capital, 
each government’s response will be inspected for any potential influences generated by the 
region’s respective social capital level. Chapter Four will summarize this study’s claim and 






By analyzing the dynamics between regional government COVID-19 policy approaches 
and social capital, this study can contribute to both the theory of social capital and the broader 
scholarship on state and society relationships. Understanding how social capital can affect 
governance during a crisis requires comparisons among Italian regions. By investigating two 
northern Italian regions with high social capital and two southern Italian regions with lower 
social capital, this study can craft substantial conclusions concerning how varying social capital 
levels can influence policy approaches during a crisis.  
This chapter explains the process for selecting these four regions and analyzes their 
respective characteristics. The first half of this analysis will investigate each region’s social 
capital, drawing on the four indicators of the civic community that Putnam identified in Making 
Democracy Work. The second half will examine each region’s susceptibility to COVID-19. To 
accurately compare each region’s policy responses to COVID-19 in spring 2020, it must be 
confirmed that each regional government had a substantive reason to be concerned about the 
virus when it was violently spreading in Lombardy in mid-February and early March 2020. To 
understand how social capital affected regional policy responses, COVID-19 must pose a 
significant threat across each of the regions taking part in this study. 
Region Selection  
Much of the variation in Italy’s policy responses to coronavirus took place among Italy’s 
twenty regions. To examine how variation in social capital affected policy responses across 
regions threatened by the virus, this study will concentrate on the Lombardy and Veneto regions 
in the North, and the Campania and Calabria regions in the South. Each region’s analysis will 
focus on the first wave of COVID-19 in Italy, which began in mid-February 2020. This first 
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wave placed regional government officials in a time-sensitive position, forcing them to devise 
wholly original and innovative policies to counter the spread, with little to no precedent to 
follow. If this study also analyzed regional government responses to the second wave of the 
virus, this standard of originality would be lost, as prior experience would prepare government 
officials.  
The sections that follow will explain why each selected region—Lombardy, Veneto, 
Campania, and Calabria—varies in terms of social capital but is similar in terms of its threat 
from COVID-19 in spring 2020. 
Social Capital 
 To accurately determine how social capital can influence government policies during a 
crisis, each selected region’s social capital level must be precisely identified and confirmed. 
Drawing on Putnam’s example, each region’s social capital level will be evaluated by examining 
the four key indicators of a civic community: association density, national referendum electoral 
turnout, newspaper readership, and preference voting levels.  
           The first core component and indicator of social capital is civic life’s vibrancy, measured 
by the number of non-governmental associations present in a community. These associations can 
range from amateur soccer clubs to non-profit groups and literary circles. Invoking de 
Tocqueville’s theory of civil society, civil associations can enhance the effectiveness, 
attentiveness, and foundations of a democratic government. In Making Democracy Work, 
Putnam confirmed De Tocqueville’s thesis by concluding that civil associations not only teach 
members empathy, cooperation, and trust, they can unify individuals from diverse backgrounds 
in the pursuit of lofty goals. When this occurs, overall governance is improved, and elected 
officials are more attentive to their constituents’ concerns.  
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An annual study conducted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) presents 
regional variation in association networks within Italy. Throughout the last twenty years, and 
regardless of location, Italy’s association networks have slowly grown. However, there is still a 
sharp divide in the density of associational life between the northern and southern Italian 
regions.41 Furthermore, the trend Putnam discovered in the popularity of soccer clubs has 
remained constant. Today, sports and recreation associations comprise 64% of the civic 
associations in Italy.42 To account for population differences, the association density variable 
will be calculated by the number of associations per 10,000 residents. In the North, the number 
of associations per 10,000 people in Lombardy was 189, while in Veneto, it was 163.43 On the 
other hand, in the southern regions, Campania’s association density level rested at 58, and 
Calabria trailed directly behind at 57 associations per 10,000 residents.44 These findings are the 
first clue to understanding the whole social capital level for each of these regions.  
The next core element of the social capital variable is newspaper readership. While 
newspapers might seem to be an outdated concept, the close linkage between newspapers and 
public interest is undeniable. Consumers can use television and radio in various ways, but when 
someone reads a newspaper, they are interested in what is happening in their community. Using 
data gathered by Istat, the exact level of newspaper readership for each of the four regions will 
be measured in the number of people who read a newspaper five or more times a week out of one 
hundred residents. In the North, both Lombardy and Veneto had 35 readers per 100 residents.45 
In the South, Campania contained 22 readers while Calabria had 26.46 While the discrepancy is 
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less defined than association density, there remains a noteworthy difference between the northern 
and southern regions. 
 The third indicator of social capital and its civic community is political participation. A 
standard measurement for political participation would be electoral turnout, but Putnam noted 
simple turnout rates can be deceiving as a measure of social capital. In many parts of Italy, 
especially in the South, vertical patronage, and quid pro quo relationships can be subtle drivers 
of electoral turnout.47 Therefore, to correctly measure political participation as a proxy for social 
capital, electoral turnout in national referenda is far more useful. Data for measuring national 
referenda turnout is provided by the Italian Department for Internal and Territorial Affairs. 
 Since the turn of the century, the scope and topic of Italian referenda have shifted away 
from household issues like divorce and renewable energy and towards constitutional reform 
packages. 48 Furthermore, the downward trend of national referenda electoral turnout in Italy has 
persisted, with only four of the last ten referendums reaching the 50% turnout threshold.49 
Despite this widespread decline in turnout, the turnout for referenda in the last twenty years is 
useful in evaluating social capital. This variable will be interpreted using the last six national 
referenda in Italy, three of which concerned the constitution's provisions. The other three 
involved electoral law reform, oil drilling, and nuclear power.50 As expected, the divide in voting 
levels between the North and South persisted. Lombardy's average turnout for these six referenda 
was 49%. When accounting for the region’s significantly larger population upwards of ten 
million, this turnout is quite high. In the second northern region, Veneto, the average referendum 
turnout sat higher at 55%. Average national referenda electoral turnout in the South remained 
 
47 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, 93. 
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lower than that in the North. In Campania, turnout hovered around 42%, and Calabria stood one 
percentage point lower at 41%.51 While the vast gap in turnout appears to have diminished since 
Putnam studied Italy's social capital disparity, the difference is still present, furthering the 
implication that the northern regions still lead the South in social capital. 
 The fourth and final indicator of social capital is preference voting levels. While Putnam 
found referenda voter turnout levels significant, he allocated far more weight to preference 
voting levels. During national elections in Italy, where voters allocate legislative seats to parties 
based on proportional representation, citizens select the political party they support. When 
Putnam was conducting his study, Italian electoral law permitted “open list voting,” where voters 
could also select a specific member from their chosen political party, utilizing their preference 
vote.52 While scholars have disputed this correlation, Putnam concluded that preference voting 
was correlated with patron-client networks, designating an overall negative correlation with 
social capital. 53 This conclusion means that regions with high preference voting levels indicate 
clientelism and low social capital levels. Due to a 1993 referendum on Italy's electoral laws, the 
open list voting system that permitted preference voting in national elections switched to a closed 
list, abolishing the preference vote. Later, the Italian Electoral Law of 2015 reverted the voting 
system back to the open list. Fortunate for this study, however, open list voting was never 
repealed for regional elections and EU elections. 
In Preferential Voting Systems: Influence on Intra-Party Competition and Voting 
Behaviour, Professor Gianluca Passarelli and his coauthors compared national and regional 
preference voting levels within Italy by taking a sample of 200 voters per election and seeing 
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how many had used their preference votes.54 Analysis of Professor Passarelli’s data partially 
confirms that the North-South social capital split in preference voting has persisted in Italy 
today.  
In regional elections, Northern populations in Lombardy and Veneto cast far less 
preference votes than the southern populations. While the most recent regional election data 
gathered is from 2010, there is little reason to believe this enduring trend has reversed. In 
samples of 200 voters in Italy’s 2010 regional elections, Lombardy had an average of 23 voters 
casting a preference vote.55 Lombardy’s northern neighbor Veneto had an average of 35 
preference voters.56 Down South, the Campania region saw a significant increase in preference 
votes cast, with an average of 91 votes cast out of 200. In Calabria, this number was 84.57 There 
is a clear disparity in preference voting levels between the northern and southern regions selected 
for this study. This preference vote indicator has a slightly weaker correlation to social capital 
because, as Professor Passarelli noted, voters do not always use their preference vote as a tool for 
patronage. Sometimes voters can cast a preference vote because their preferred candidate has 
been friendly to them. Nevertheless, it is useful to investigate this indicator despite it having a 
weaker correlation to social capital. The collected statistics for each of the region’s four social 












Table 2.1 Regional Trends in Social Capital Indicators 
  
Association 








Lombardy 189 35 49% 23 
 
Veneto 163 35 55% 35 
 
Campania 58 22 42% 91 
 
Calabria 57 26 41% 84 
Sources: Istat (Association Density and Newspaper Readership), Italian Department for Internal 
and Territorial Affairs (Referenda Turnout), Prof. Gianluca Passarelli (Preference Voting) 
 
a Association Density measured in number of associations per 10,000 residents.  
b Newspaper Readership measured in number of residents who read newspapers 5+ times a week 
per 100 residents. 
c Natl. Referenda Turnout measured in average regional turnout over the last six national 
referendums. 
d Preference Voting measured in number of preference votes cast out of 200 voters in 2010 
gubernatorial elections.  
 
After examining all of the civic community’s indicators, it is clear that the four regions 
selected for this study will accurately represent the variation of social capital in Italy, with higher 
levels in the North and lower levels in the South. While it appears that the social capital gap that 
Putnam discovered between the North and South has since narrowed, these regions still have 
evident disparities. Lombardy and Veneto continue to present higher social capital levels than 
their southern counterparts in Campania and Calabria. With the social capital levels concretely 
defined for each region, this process can proceed to the next criterion for region eligibility: 
whether or not COVID-19 was posing enough of a threat to motivate policymakers to take 
address it. 
Concern for COVID-19 
 For the regions of Lombardy, Veneto, and Campania, in mid-February 2020, COVID-19 
threatened the regions’ immense populations. These three regions all have populations above 
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five million, meaning the potential for a deadly human spread was extremely high. Furthermore, 
these three regions all contain dense cities that serve as popular tourist destinations: Milan in 
Lombardy, Venice in Veneto, and Naples in Campania. The presence of these dense urban 
environments, and the possibility of spreading the virus to other countries were most likely 
concerning for regional policymakers when facing the outbreak.  
The concern caused by COVID-19’s early spread in Italy for the regional government in 
Calabria is unique compared to the other three regions. Calabria is one of the poorest regions in 
Italy, with a considerably weak economy and healthcare infrastructure. For Calabria, while the 
virus was spreading thousands of miles away, the regional government knew of the tremendous 
economic damage the virus would inflict if it made its way into the region. The stakes were 
raised even higher due to the majority of Calabria’s economy relying on tourism. If COVID-19 
reached the region, the result would be both an economic and healthcare catastrophe. Regional 
government officials in Calabria were mindful of this in the early days of Italy’s grapple with the 
virus.58 
COVID-19’s physical presence would also be useful in indicating a government’s 
concern, so with the exception of Calabria, Lombardy, Veneto, and Campania were selected 
based upon how quickly the virus was spreading within each region during the early stage of the 
Italian outbreak. By establishing a standard of concern for coronavirus across selected regional 
governments, policy responses can be accurately compared, and social capital’s influences can 
be identified.  
On March 2nd, 2020, eleven days after Lombardy's health officials confirmed the 
presence of an uncontrolled outbreak, the Italian Department of Civil Protection began releasing 
 
58 “CORONAVIRUS, JOLE SANTELLI.” February 23, 2020. 
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data from COVID-19 test results conducted throughout the nation. In the eight days from March 
2nd to March 9th, confirmed coronavirus cases nationwide grew by 345%, from 2,063 to 9,172. In 
this same period, the Lombardy, Veneto, and Campania regions saw cases increase at a similarly 
rapid rate. As the center of the outbreak, Lombardy's cases grew from 1,254 to 5,467, a 336% 
increase. Neighboring to the east of Lombardy, the Veneto region witnessed a case increase from 
273 to 694, a 154% growth. Down South, the region of Campania saw cases grow from 17 to 
120, for an increase of 605%. For these three regions, COVID-19 was spreading rapidly. 
Therefore, government officials were likely feeling pressured to implement policies to slow the 
spread of the disease. Meanwhile, in Calabria, from the 173 tests taken from March 2nd to March 
9th, the region's cases went from one to eleven. While this caseload might not appear as alarming 
as the other regions, due to Calabria's economic and healthcare vulnerabilities, it is more than 
likely that coronavirus's mere presence within the region was problematic to policymakers.  
Table 2.2 Coronavirus Case increase from March 2nd to March 9th 
  March 2nd Cases March 9th Cases % Increase  Tests Taken a 
 
Lombardy 1,254 5,467 336% 12,210 
 
Veneto 273 694 154% 6,174 
 
Campania 17 120 605% 607 
 
Calabria 1 11 909% 134 
 
Nationwide 2,063 9,172 345% 30,481 
Source: Italian Department of Civil Protection   
a Tests taken from March 2nd to March 9th  
While concern is not a quantifiable variable, it does have an underlying binary quality. 
When confronting a pandemic, you are either concerned for the virus, or you are not at all. As an 
elected official responsible for protecting those who put you in power, a pandemic would be 
extremely worrisome. Elected officials are primarily interested in increasing the likelihood of 
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remaining in power, and it is undeniable that your constituents' wellbeing is associated with this 
likelihood. When a virus with the potential to eliminate hundreds of thousands of your 
constituents comes knocking on your region's doorstep, you will notice. While an elected 
official's actions in response to concern can vary, what matters in this study is that there was that 
concern in the first place. These four particular regions have been selected because each regional 
government was undoubtedly aware of the virus and the potential devastation it could leave if it 
remained unaddressed. These regions may have had different reasons to fear the virus. Still, 
regardless, the concern for the virus was there, and policymakers were in the position to act.  
Expected Outcomes 
 Before proceeding to this study’s empirical analysis, it is necessary to revisit the 
alternative hypotheses. It would be unreasonable to expect government officials to only have 
accounted for social capital when they developed their COVID-19 solutions, so it is still 
necessary to examine what else may have contributed to the policymaking process, and how 
these factors differed across the regions.  
 The first alternative hypothesis (AH1) posits that regions containing older and more 
densely settled populations had regional governments that responded vigorously to the virus. 
Due to COVID-19’s significantly higher mortality for older age groups combined with its high 
rate of transmission, it would make rational sense for regional governments with older and 
densely settled populations to respond more aggressively. For this hypothesis to be confirmed, 
the regions with older average populations (Lombardian and Venetian populations both have 
average ages of 46) will respond in similarly assertive fashions.59 The second requirement for 




zealously than others. This variable can also be judged by comparing the responses of the 
Lombardian and Venetian governments, where Lombardy’s population density is far greater than 
Veneto’s.60 For this hypothesis to be denied, there needs to be no correlation with higher 
population age and density to assertive policy approaches. 
 The second alternative hypothesis (AH2) claims that the assertiveness of the region’s 
policy response is dependent on the strength of the region’s healthcare infrastructure. This 
variable could be significant because healthcare systems are directly tied to the region’s ability in 
combatting the COVID-19 crisis.  For this hypothesis to be substantiated, the regions with far 
poorer healthcare systems (Campania and Calabria), will approach policymaking in equally 
aggressive manners. On the other hand, in the northern regions with strong healthcare systems, 
regional governments might have responded slowly to the outbreak, knowing their healthcare 
systems were strong. If the policy styles across the two southern regions or across the two 
northern regions are not inversely proportional to their healthcare strength similar, then AH2 
cannot be accepted. 
 The third and final alternative hypothesis (AH3) speculates that regions with high levels 
of support for right-wing political parties contain governments that responded slowly to the 
crisis. As this appeared to be a trend in the United States, it is worth analyzing in the hyper-
partisan Italian political climate. A compelling method to judge this hypothesis is to compare the 
Lombardian and Venetian policy approaches, where both region’s Governors are members of the 
far-right political party known as the Northern League. If both region’s policy approaches are 
passive and ineffective, this can confirm the hypothesis. However, if either one or both of these 
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governments pursues an aggressive and assertive policy approach to the crisis, then this 
hypothesis will be rejected.  
Conclusion 
Italy's regional government officials faced an unprecedented challenge when coronavirus 
began spreading through their nation. With no viable guide to follow, the virus's potential 
devastation forced Italian regional governments to make tough policy decisions, knowing that 
the cost for failure would not only be human lives, but also their careers. This problematic 
position warrants an investigation into Italy and its regional governments within. In choosing 
each of these regions, policymaking conditions have been aligned, ensuring that all regions are 
more or less equally threatened by the virus, with this threat commencing simultaneously, during 
the start of Italy's first wave of contagion. By putting each of these regions through a preliminary 
analysis, it can be concluded that all selected regions, representing their end of social capital, are 
fairly oriented on the starting line. This is not to say that each region’s relationship to the 
outbreak is exactly the same. As the next chapter will explain, some situational factors differ 
between the regions. This is especially the case for the Lombardy region, which contained the 
outbreak’s epicenter. The following chapter, the most important one for this study, will explain 
how each of these four region's governments responded to the unprecedented COVID-19 




 When one imagines a pandemic, the first images that come to mind range from the hellish 
drawings of the Black Death to the eerie photographs of the polio pandemic's iron lung 
ventilators. Of all kinds of crises, pandemics are uniquely dangerous and challenging to control. 
Unlike declarations of war or a bubble popping on Wall Street, viral pandemics are often 
completely silent when they begin. Further complicating matters is the obvious fact that 
politicians cannot negotiate with a virus. Viruses do not take bribes and are not intimidated by 
pre-emptive drone strikes. When a virus spreads at a rapid speed, it can be nearly impossible to 
contain. When it poses a deadly threat to specific populations, the potential for catastrophe is 
immense. If a government and its citizens fail to act decisively to a pandemic, the crisis can 
result in a devastating loss of life. 
 Moreover, unlike in other crises, a government cannot fight a pandemic alone. The only 
way for a government and its people to survive a pandemic is through close collaboration. A 
foundational prerequisite for effective collaboration between any two entities is trust. In the case 
of a pandemic, trust must function bilaterally – the government institution needs to trust its 
people, and the people must trust their government institution.61 Governments must rely on their 
constituents’ compliance, which is especially difficult when policies include unenforceable 
precautions like hand-washing and mask-wearing.62 Citizens must place their trust in two places. 
First, to feel like they can make a difference as individuals, citizens need to trust one another, 
believing that if they do their part others will do the same. Second, citizens need to trust their 
government institutions, having faith that whatever policy response is applied, it will be effective 
and worth the effort. Since trust is a foundational part of social capital, social capital may have 
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played an intriguing role in how Italy’s regional governments and other democratic institutions 
formulated COVID-19 policies, as well as how those policies succeeded in stemming the 
pandemic. 
 COVID-19, also known as SARS-CoV-2, proved itself to be the “perfect storm” of a 
pandemic. While the disease was not as deadly as other coronaviruses like SARS which killed 
one in ten people,63 COVID-19’s lethality for certain subpopulations, coupled with its ability to 
spread rapidly, made it extremely dangerous.64 Additionally, COVID-19 was an entirely novel 
and unidentified virus, leaving health officials scrambling to understand it. Policymakers, who 
were initially as confused as health experts, drafted containment policies on-the-fly, knowing 
that the virus was selecting a new target with every passing minute. In the first months of the 
new decade, the pandemic tested every government’s ability to mobilize efficiently. Failure to 
act quickly usually resulted in governments hopelessly watching the virus wreak havoc through 
their communities. 
The findings from this study suggest that social capital may have played an underlying 
and noteworthy role in shaping regional government policy approaches to COVID-19. In the first 
few months of the crisis, regional governments acted in ways that indicate they were being 
influenced by their civic community’s strengths or weaknesses. For example, in the high social 
capital regions, government officials showed signs of hesitancy towards enacting policies that 
could potentially fail. This indecisiveness implies that government officials knew their civic 
communities held them to high standards, and if they fell short of these standards, the civic 
community would hold them accountable. On the other hand, when regional governments found 
the confidence to act, their civic communities collectively mobilized to help facilitate policy 
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success. In the South, regional governments approached COVID-19 policy urgently and 
coercively. This bold approach could be a reflection of the regions’ weak healthcare 
infrastructures, which may have been weak due to the regions’ social capital scarcity. Their 
assertive strategy could also potentially signal that social capital’s absence made regional 
governments mistrust their citizens collective ability to comply with lockdown protocols, thus 
motivating the governments to use a more involved policies in protecting the regions. These 
conclusions concerning the civic community’s effects on policy approaches could potentially 
place social capital in a meaningful position for explaining effective crisis governance.  
This chapter will first explain how the pandemic began, how it arrived in Italy, and the 
Italian central government's policy response. After providing the context for the larger crisis, this 
chapter will include an analysis of how each selected region chose to confront the virus and how 
social capital may have influenced each regional government’s policy approaches, and their 
results.  
The First Wave of COVID-19 in Italy 
 While the origins of the virus remain unclear, the World Health Organization states that 
in late 2019, the novel COVID-19 disease passed from an infected bat to a human in the Huanan 
Seafood Wholesale Market of Wuhan City, located in the Hubei Province in Central China.65 
The pathogen proceeded to spread throughout Wuhan. Due to the population movement 
occurring in preparation for the Chinese New Year celebration, the virus quickly reached thirty 
provinces outside of Hubei.66 With an incubation period of three days, the virus speedily infected 
family members and medical workers. By the end of January 2020, the World Health 
Organization confirmed more than 10,000 cases across China and issued a Global Health 
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Emergency.67 Beijing responded to the unprecedented outbreak by allocating significant funds 
towards public health services and imposing a lockdown for the eleven million people living in 
Wuhan.68  
 To slow the outbreak’s speed, Hubei’s provincial government, in cooperation with 
Beijing, declared for its 60 million inhabitants a “sealed containment” protocol.69 Using 
volunteers from civil society associations, the provincial government began physically sealing 
people in their homes, building barricades, and ramping up surveillance to ensure widespread 
compliance with their decree.70 While these measures effectively slowed the spread within 
China, the Chinese government had not moved fast enough to prevent the virus from entering 
other countries. By January 31st, Italy, the United States, Germany, Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan 
located COVID-19 in isolated cases.71 The first outbreak of COVID-19 took place in Wuhan, but 
soon, the Italian region of Lombardy would be next in line.  
 Until mid-February, the Italian government had identified three cases of the novel 
coronavirus, and effectively isolated them. On January 29th, Italian health officials detected the 
first two cases when a Chinese couple traveling from Wuhan flew to Milan and a week later 
began developing symptoms of the virus in Rome.72 While no additional cases arose due to the 
couple, this incident served as a wake-up call for the Italian central government led by former 
Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte. On January 30th, two days after the couple arrived at Rome’s 
Larazzo Spallanzani National Institute for Infectious Diseases, the central government suspended 
all international flights to and from China. This decision made Italy the first EU state to impose 
 
67 Zu et al., “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).” 
68 Zhang et al., “COVID-19 Containment,” 215. 
69 Wu, “Sealed In.” 
70 Wu. 
71 “A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020.” 
72 Frignani, “Prima a Milano, Poi l’hotel a Roma.” 
 40 
restrictions on travel.73 On January 31st, the Conte government declared a state of national 
emergency, granting the central government assertive action in preventing and addressing an 
outbreak. The third and final isolated case before the outbreak was contracted on February 6th by 
an Italian national who evacuated from Wuhan the week prior.74 
The First Three Days of Italy’s Outbreak  
 Italy discovered the first coronavirus outbreak in the western world during the night of 
Thursday, February 20th, when a 38-year-old man, who the nation would soon know as “patient 
one," tested positive for COVID-19 inside a Lombardy hospital.75 After the patient showed 
resistance to a flu treatment, an anesthetist named Annalisa Malara decided to test the individual 
for COVID-19.76 When the positive test result arrived, Malara became the doctor who 
discovered the Italian coronavirus outbreak.  
 Located just 40 miles south of Milan in the town of Codogno,77 the hospital treating 
patient one became the center of the outbreak, and Codogno became the “Wuhan of Italy.”78 
Before this case was confirmed, doctors in the hospital had reported an influx of unexplained and 
"weird" cases of a pneumonia-like illness.79 What made patient one’s case especially disturbing 
was his infection’s uncertain cause. Patient one had no relevant travel history to China and had 
zero contact with the other confirmed cases.80 The only plausible source of transmission occurred 
two weeks earlier, on January 21st, when he had dinner with a European who recently returned 
from a business trip to Asia.81 
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 To make matters worse, patient one had an active social life. In the time between his 
infection and testing positive in the Codogno hospital, he had gone to work, participated in two 
half marathon races, routinely played recreational soccer, and attended multiple business 
dinners.82 The infected individual was asymptomatic until February 14th, when he began 
displaying flu-like symptoms, and a doctor prescribed him medication in the town of Castiglione 
d'Adda.83 Upon receiving his positive test result, his pregnant wife and another close friend 
rushed to a Milan hospital.84 An Italian Epidemiologist grimly stated, “who we call ‘Patient One’ 
was probably ‘Patient 200.”85 
Friday, February 21st 
 On the morning of February 21st, Guilio Gallera, Lombardy’s Councilor for Welfare, held 
a press conference and shared the disturbing news. With advice from health experts, Councilor 
Gallera correctly claimed that patient one’s case was of asymptomatic contagion, and patient one 
had been unknowingly spreading the virus for upwards of eighteen days.86 On the first full day of 
the outbreak, confirmed coronavirus cases jumped from zero to sixteen, with fourteen in 
Lombardy and two in Veneto.87  
 Responding quickly to the surge of cases, the Governor of Lombardy, Attilio Fontana, 
collaborated with the Ministry of Health and the Department of Civil Protection to create an 
emergency task force to govern the region's intensive care units (ICU).88 At this time, 
Lombardy’s ICUs contained 720 beds across 74 hospitals.89 An un-mitigated spread of the virus 
 
82 “Coronavirus, in Veneto la prima vittima, Adriano Trevisan, 78 anni. Venti contagiati in Italia. Conte.” 
83 “Codogno, i medici dell’ospedale in trincea.” 
84 “Codogno, i medici dell’ospedale in trincea.” 
85 Horowitz, Bubola, and Povoledo, “Italy, Pandemic’s New Epicenter, Has Lessons for the World.” 
86 QuotidianoNet, “Coronavirus, Altro Caso in Italia. Italiano Ricoverato a Codogno (Lodi).” 
87 “Codogno, i medici dell’ospedale in trincea.” 
88 Grasselli, Pesenti, and Cecconi, “Critical Care Utilization for the COVID-19 Outbreak in Lombardy, Italy.” 
89 Grasselli, Pesenti, and Cecconi. 
 42 
would quickly overwhelm the region's ICU facilities, so the task force's primary assignment was 
to identify ways to increase ICU capacity.90 By the end of February 21st, the virus had claimed 
the first Italian victim, a 78-year-old man admitted into a Veneto hospital ten days before.91 The 
worst nightmare of every Italian became a reality. Many anxiously looked at China, which now 
had 75,000 cases, with the number of deceased climbing steadily at 2,236.92  
Saturday, February 22nd 
 On the next day, the rate of the infections radically increased, sowing chaos in Lombardy. 
Confirmed cases in northern Italy rose to 76, with 54 in Lombardy, 17 in Veneto, two in Emilia 
Romagna, two in Lazio, and one in Piedmont.93 Two COVID-19 cases emerged in Milan, 
sending the city's five-person public health team scrambling to identify patient one's 
connection.94,95 By now, Lombardy health officials had sent 18 infected individuals with severe 
respiratory symptoms to ICU units.96 
 After another fatality – this time a 68-year-old woman in Lombardy’s Lodi province – 
Governor Fontana publicly stated that the number of people who needed to enter isolation would 
“be very significant.”97 Lombardy government officials began receiving hundreds of questions 
from anxious business owners hoping to keep their doors open.98 Representatives replied saying 
“There is no evidence to make us think about the closure of public services, but we are ready, 
and we are gearing up to be able to take all the necessary measures."99 From northern to southern 
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regional governments, fear was spreading faster than the virus. Southern regional officials, 
especially in Campania, Puglia, and Calabria, panicked, knowing that the virus could quickly 
shatter their regions’ fragile healthcare systems. 
 Only two days into the outbreak, miscommunication between municipal, regional 
government, and central officials was already becoming an issue. While the Lombardy 
government warned of locking the region down, numerous municipal governments and the 
central government in Rome were sending mixed messages, hinting that a region-wide shutdown 
would be an unnecessary overreaction.100 This ambiguous response tricked many Lombardy 
citizens into believing that everyday life could go on normally.101   
Sunday, February 23rd 
 By the third full day of the outbreak, it was clear that the virus had gotten a significant 
head start, and was showing no signs of slowing. The number of coronavirus cases in Italy grew 
to 152, ranking the nation third globally for infections, behind South Korea’s 602 and China’s 
76,936.102 In northern Italy, Lombardy contained 110 cases, Veneto 21, and Emilia Romagna 
9.103 Milan alone contained over 100 of the cases in Lombardy.104 The coronavirus also claimed 
its third Italian victim, an elderly woman in a Lombardy hospital.105 By now, the window of 
opportunity to completely isolate, trace, and quash the virus had long passed.  
 The first substantial policy response arrived later in the day when Governor Fontana, the 
central government’s Minister of Health, Roberto Speranza, and Councilor Gallera held a chaotic 
press conference.106 To curb the contagion’s speed, the Lombardy government, in collaboration 
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with Rome, passed a decree designating infected municipalities as the Red Zone.107 This Red 
Zone included ten municipalities in Lombardy and one in Veneto.108 This decree mandated a 
strict quarantine for all 50,000 citizens inside the Red Zone, banning all public gatherings, 
religious services, recreational sports, schooling, and commercial activities (except for essential 
services like supermarkets and pharmacies).109 Citing the recommendations provided by the 
World Health Organization, Governor Fontana, Councilor Gallera, and Health Minister Speranza 
stated that containing the virus required the lockdown.110 To prevent citizens from leaving or 
entering the Red Zone, the Lombardy government dispatched 500 police officers while the 
central government mobilized the armed forces.111 This policy created the COVID-19 
pandemic’s first lockdown inside a western nation. The February 23rd decree revealed the 
extraordinary measures that both regional and central governments were willing to take to 
combat the virus. Seeing how quickly the government acted to lock 50,000 people inside their 
homes, people across Lombardy worried that their own shutdown was inevitable.112 
The First Wave in Full Swing 
 Over the next few days, infections continued to increase in northern Italy. Italy’s 
economy was also beginning to suffer. Before the end of February, the stock market had 
collapsed, millions of tourists canceled their visits, and the U.S State Department asked 
Americans to avoid Italy at all costs.113 By Wednesday, March 4th, coronavirus cases nationwide 
numbered over 3,000 with 107 fatalities.114  
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 Two weeks after the February 23rd decree, on Sunday, March 8th, with nationwide cases 
numbering 7,375, and 366 dead, the central government finally took action with another decree. 
Signed by President Mattarella, the March 8th decree extended the Red Zone to all of Lombardy 
and 14 provinces divided between the Veneto and Emilia Romagna regions.115 This policy also 
forced the nationwide prohibition on all public gatherings, including all forms of schooling, 
religious events, and sports competitions.116 Unfortunately, the night before the Prime Minister 
released the decree, a draft was leaked to the media. When the story broke, thousands of people 
in Milan fled to other regions throughout Italy.117 Due to this costly blunder with the media, 
Prime Minister Conte enacted the March 9th “I Stay Home” decree, expanding the Red Zone to 
all regions, and commencing “Phase 1.”118 Hoping to end the nationwide shutdown by April 3rd, 
this new decree barred citizens from crossing municipality borders except for “well-grounded 
work-related reasons or situations of need, or movements for health reasons.”119 The vagueness 
of these exceptions created new challenges for sub-national governments trying to enforce the 
lockdown.120 All of these policies subjected violators to harsh criminal penalties. By March 31st, 
daily deaths peaked at 2,000 and coronavirus had already killed 0.1% of the Italian population.121 
In just over one month, from February 21st to March 31st, the Italian death toll nearly tripled from 
477 to 1,338.122 These official mortality statistics are suspected of being underreported by a 
factor of two.123 
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 The “Phase 1” lockdown order ended on May 4th with “Phase 2,” when the central 
government permitted bars and restaurants to reopen, citizens to return to work, and citizens to 
visit family members if they were in the same municipality.124 “Phase 3” arrived a month later, 
fully reopening Italy with the exception of schools (see Table 3.1 for reference).125 By the end of 
July, COVID-19 infected 245,000 Italians, claiming 35,000 lives, with most deaths occurring in 
Lombardy. 126,127 From February to August, the average mortality rate in Italy was 14.2%, the 
fifth highest mortality rate in the world.128  






  In later waves throughout 2020 and early 2021, COVID-19 continued to evade the 
central and regional government containment measures, forcing Italian health experts to 
desperately chase the virus down.129 In a matter of months after the first wave, the virus returned 
in full swing, and by mid-December, during the second wave, Italy’s death toll reached 
65,000.130 As of early-April 2021, coronavirus fatalities in Italy have skyrocketed to 112,000, 
and regional governments have recently reinstated Red Zone restrictions.131   
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Findings 
 Despite the first wave of COVID-19 being highly centralized in the North, this was 
unquestionably a national crisis. There is no doubt that healthcare systems, economics, and 
political motivations are relevant in explaining regional government responses and the 
effectiveness of these responses. Yet social capital also may have played an underlying role in 
influencing the regional governments’ responses, the policies they pursued, and the policies’ 
efficacy. While government officials did not explicitly refer to social capital in their policy 
approaches, it is possible that social capital was a nearly unconscious influence on COVID-19 
policymaking.  
 To make this argument clear and compelling, the following sections will analyze each of 
the selected regional governments during the pandemic and why social capital was an underlying 
influence on local policy solutions, and the overall effectiveness of these solutions. Research for 
this comparative case study was gathered from primary and secondary sources as well as virtual 
interviews with Lombardian and Campanian government officials. 
The Lombardian Case 
 Compared to every other Italian region, Lombardy was disproportionately devastated by 
the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since it contained the outbreak’s epicenter, in some 
respects, Lombardy can be seen as an outlier from the other three regions in this study. But while 
some facets of the crisis fell outside the regional government’s control, the government’s 
indecisive and elusive approach to coronavirus policymaking was its fatal flaw. Rather than 
immediately taking decisive public policy action to combat the outbreak, the Lombardy 
government hesitated and pointed fingers at Rome. As a result of this ineffective policy 
approach, in the crucial first weeks of the crisis, the government did not choose a clear and 
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absolute policy solution. Instead, the regional government confused municipalities and citizens, 
and allowed the central government to undermine the region’s healthcare policies. 
Social Capital’s Paralyzing Threat of Accountability 
Social capital may have contributed to the Lombardy government’s reluctant 
policymaking approach. Lombardy’s high social capital level could be related to the regional 
government’s indecisive response in that officials knew their highly civically engaged populace 
would hold them accountable for any ineffective policy. Therefore, in the most critical period of 
the crisis, the civic community’s threat of political accountability may have paralyzed 
Lombardy’s elected officials, preventing them from taking the necessary yet potentially 
politically risky measures to fight the virus.   
 High standards and expectations for the regional government are engrained into the civic 
community’s history and tradition. These high standards are enforced by the civic community’s 
specialized ability to collectively mobilize and hold government officials politically and legally 
accountable. Throughout their careers, Lombardy government officials probably witnessed this 
trend of strict accountability. When the COVID-19 outbreak erupted, knowing that their 
economy and their constituents’ lives were in jeopardy, these government officials likely felt 
intense pressure to enact successful policies. If these policies somehow failed, causing citizens to 
die or the economy to crash, then officials could assume the civic community would be 
especially unforgiving in the aftermath. The heightened pressure on policymakers consequently 
made them unwilling to implement policies that were not guaranteed to succeed. So instead of 
taking a daunting political gamble, Lombardian officials chose to play a reclusive role in the 
crisis, likely in hopes that the civic community would punish the central government instead of 
them. Evidence of social capital’s influence can be seen in the government’s ambiguous and 
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unclear pubic stance on the crisis. The regional Governor’s confusing public rhetoric suggests 
that social capital’s constant reminder of accountability contributed to the Lombardy 
government’s ineffective policy approach. 
Evidence of Civic Intimidation: A Paralyzed and Elusive Policy Response 
 Social capital’s pernicious influence on the Lombardy government’s response to COVID-
19 policymaking can be identified in the regional government’s confusing and ambiguous public 
messaging. From the very beginning of the outbreak, Lombardy Governor Attilio Fontana was 
fully aware of COVID-19’s potential for catastrophe in his region. Less than twenty-four hours 
after patient one tested positive for coronavirus, Governor Fontana created a task force to 
increase ICU capacity in the region’s dense hospital network. Shortly after, he asked the central 
government to assist in shutting down the infected municipalities.132 Rome obliged, and in 
coordination with Lombardy, passed the February 23rd decree, establishing a lockdown for the 
region’s ten infected municipalities.   
The Lombardy Government’s COVID-19 Policy Dilemma 
 Once the February 23rd decree isolated the Red Zone municipalities, the central 
government, hoping to prevent panic and keep the northern economy open, assured the nation 
that COVID-19 was not spreading in Lombardy, and shutting down the whole region was an 
obvious overreaction.133 Behind closed doors, the Lombardy government persistently urged the 
fervently dismissive central government to truthfully address the virus’s seriousness.  
  The central government’s misleading messaging forced Lombardy’s government into an 
unprecedented policy conundrum. Either the regional government could nod its head with Rome 
and falsely comfort the public that the Red Zone fully contained the virus, or they could make 
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the correct decision by publicly advocating for a more comprehensive lockdown policy. Both of 
these choices contained significant political risks, which social capital may have helped 
intensify. Neither choice guaranteed success. Choosing to side with Rome ran the risk of the 
virus continuing to spread, meaning the regional government would be just as much to blame as 
the central government. On the other hand, choosing to publicly contest Rome by advocating for 
a stronger policy response had its own inherent risks too. Lombardy is the industrial center of the 
country.134 In the case of a region-wide lockdown, the economic repercussions would be 
massive, not just for Lombardy, but the entire Italian nation. Local businesses in the ten Red 
Zone municipalities were already losing 50 million euros every single day.135 Furthermore, if the 
regional government initiated the momentum towards a lockdown and Rome was somehow 
correct in claiming a lockdown was an overreaction, the regional government officials would 
solely be to blame. Finally, this decision was especially daunting to regional policymakers who 
were unsure if they could violate civil liberties with a comprehensive lockdown.136 
The Lombardy Government’s Response: Indecisiveness and Scapegoating Rome 
 When the outbreak shoved them into this challenging political puzzle, the Lombardy 
government froze. It is possible that neither choice convinced the regional government that they 
could successfully solve the crisis, and ultimately dodge the civic community’s accountability. In 
response to being cornered by this seemingly unwinnable policy dilemma, the Lombardy 
government crafted a third option; making it appear that the central government was fully in 
charge of policymaking and blaming Rome when the crisis inevitably worsened.  
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 Afraid to implement a decisive policy strategy, Lombardy government officials appear to 
have looked for a way out of the policymaking position entirely. Rome’s loud and misleading 
voice may have provided the Lombardy government with this escape route. By using Rome as a 
scapegoat, they could potentially redirect their civic community’s crosshairs away from 
themselves. First, however, in order to convince the civic community that they were innocent, 
the regional government needed to allow Rome to misguide their initial policy approach. By 
briefly parroting Rome’s rhetoric and conforming to their misguided directives, when the crisis 
worsened, the regional government could turn around and use Rome as a scapegoat. This may 
have appeared to be the only viable strategy in avoiding the civic community’s collective wrath.  
 Scapegoating Rome might have also appeared especially compelling because of the 
Italian populations newfound trust in the central government. As Falcone et al. discovered, when 
the COVID-19 pandemic arrived, Italians across the country decided that the best way to face the 
crisis was to trust their institutions. As a result of the developing health crisis, Italy experienced a 
“trust boom,” and citizens chose to place their trust primarily in their central government. 137,138 
Lombardy government officials may have seen this trust and dependence in the central 
government as a way to outsource policymaking to Rome. This public image of dependence on 
Rome meant that when the central government inevitably failed to solve the crisis, the Lombardy 
government could use the excuse that they trusted Rome just as everyone else did.  
 This scapegoating strategy can be identified in the regional Governor’s rapidly shifting 
rhetoric within a period of five days. From February 22nd to February 27th Governor Fontana’s 
stance on the virus frantically flipped back and forth. Within three days from February 22nd to 
February 25th, Governor Fontana went from warning that more people would be required to enter 
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lockdown to equating COVID-19 to the common flu. 139,140 The Governor’s ignorant rhetoric on 
February 25th matches the Prime Minister’s, who claimed on the very same day that “Italy is a 
safe country and probably safer than many others.”141 On February 27th, after conforming to 
Rome’s request to only test people showing COVID-19 symptoms, Governor Fontana reverted 
back to publicly calling the virus a serious threat and accusing the central government of hiding 
from reality.142 These dramatic shifts in rhetoric suggest that the regional government briefly 
allowed itself to be led astray by the central government, so it could quickly switch back to its 
initial position and make Rome appear to be the crisis’s culprit.  
 As his government continued to sidestep policymaking by blaming Rome for the crisis, 
the Governor was constantly pressuring the central government to take the virus seriously. 143 
The Prime Minister replied to this pressure by warning Lombardy and Veneto’s governments 
“not to go out of order because the measures risk being harmful.”144 Meanwhile, Governor 
Fontana began storming out of virtual meetings with the Prime Minister’s cabinet.145 Despite the 
Governor’s private pleas, the Conte Government refused to mobilize until they had no choice but 
to lock Lombardy down on March 8th, 17 days after the outbreak began.146 
 During one of this study’s interviews with Lombardy government health officials, the 
officials insisted that after the February 23rd decree, the regional government was unsure of 
whether they or Rome were responsible for creating coronavirus policies. While this certainly 
may have been the case, it is odd that when Rome appeared openly dismissive of the crisis after 
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February 23rd, Lombardy officials, who knew Rome was going to fail them, did not step up to the 
task and take the necessary policy action.147 
The Lombardian Approach’s Result: Irresponsible Policies and an Unclear Stance 
 Lombardy’s hesitant and elusive COVID-19 policy approach was ineffective in 
combatting the virus for two primary reasons. First, to acquire sufficient ammunition to 
effectively blame Rome for mishandling the crisis, the Lombardy Government allowed the 
central government to bully it into making irresponsible policy decisions. Second, with no clear 
guidance from the regional government, municipalities and citizens became confused and 
disorganized, and many continued with their daily lives, further spreading the virus. 
Irresponsible Policies: Hospital Admissions and Testing Protocols 
 It is possible that to effectively propagate the narrative that Rome was responsible for 
policymaking and the Lombardy government was just following orders and trusting Rome’s 
guidance, the Lombardy government allowed Rome to influence its COVID-19 healthcare 
policies. Despite knowing that Rome was terribly misguided, the regional government still 
succumbed to Rome’s suggestions. The clearest cases of this policy submission can be found in 
the region’s hospital admittance and testing policies.  
 After February 23rd, as the virus continued spreading rapidly throughout Lombardy and 
into neighboring regions, Prime Minister Conte scolded Governor Fontana for wearing a mask 
and attacked the Codogno hospital for being the epicenter of the outbreak.148 Prime Minister 
Conte’s criticism of the Codogno hospital staff had deadly consequences for Lombardy’s 
healthcare workers. To convince Rome that they were treating COVID-19 cases, Lombardy 
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health officials ordered hospitals to admit patients whether they were symptomatic or not.149 This 
policy resulted in Lombardy hospitals admitting 65% of infected people, causing coronavirus to 
quickly overrun hospitals. 150 By March 4th, the president of Lombardy’s anesthetists association 
said that he could “count the free [ICU] spots in the hospitals on the fingers of two hands.”151As 
the regional government privately quarreled with the central governments, ghastly photographs 
of Lombardy hospital hallways cluttered with occupied beds and exhausted healthcare workers 
sleeping in their protective equipment circulated the internet.152 By the end of the first wave sixty 
Italian doctors were left dead, with the majority of them from Lombardy.153 
 Another example of the Lombardy government knowingly permitting Rome to damage 
its COVID-19 response can be seen in the region’s testing policy. After regional government 
health officials detected an outbreak in Codogno, they ordered all local citizens to receive 
COVID-19 tests, whether they had symptoms or not.154 When word of this testing policy reached 
Rome, the central government argued that Lombardy was inflating case numbers and ordered 
testing to be limited to people displaying symptoms.155 Unwilling to contest this order, the 
Lombardy government listened and proceeded to scale back its testing policy.156 By the end of 
the first wave, the testing rate (tests per 1000 residents) in Lombardy was half that of Veneto’s, 
despite Lombardy’s outbreak being significantly more violent.157 A timeline depicting the 
Lombardy Regional government’s policy solutions to the outbreak can be seen in Table 3.2. 
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(1) Feb. 21: ICU Task Force created by Governor Fontana, and schools are closed. 
(2) Feb. 27: Hospital and testing policies enacted, Mayor of Milan launches “Milan Doesn’t 
Stop” Campaign. 
(3) March 4: Lombardy ICU facilities are overrun by coronavirus. 
 
Disorganizing Municipal Governments and the Civic Community 
 The second reason the Lombardy regional government’s policy approach to COVID-19 
was ineffective is that it did not produce a clear and coherent directive for municipal 
governments and the Lombardy civic community. The first clear sign of confusion came from 
the municipalities. In the immediate days after the February 23rd decree, Mayors across the 
region became frustrated with the regional government and demanded answers on how to 
proceed.158 Unable to get a clear directive from the regional government, it appears that some 
municipalities turned to Rome. For instance, on February 27th, Beppe Sala, the Mayor of Milan, 
launched a “Milan Doesn’t Stop” campaign to reassure citizens that everything was normal.159 
As a result of the Lombardy government’s unclear communication, municipal governments 
turned to the more decisive central government. Consequently, citizens living outside of the 
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February 23rd Red Zone municipalities continued to spread the disease as they went on with their 
everyday lives.160  
 The Lombardy government’s unclear policy approach to addressing the crisis also 
puzzled the citizens. When the outbreak began in Lombardy, the regional government had an 
extraordinary tool at its disposal: the civic community. If policymakers had implemented a clear-
cut COVID-19 solution to take advantage of the civic community’s collectivizing capabilities, 
then the civic community would have decisively mobilized, and the virus might have been more 
effectively contained. The Lombardy government could have looked to their civic community 
more as a tool for success rather than weapon for accountability. But instead, the policymakers 
were paralyzed by pressure, and rather than devising ways to effectively combat Rome’s 
misinformation, the government looked for ways to escape liability. Fearing widespread political 
backlash from the civic community, municipalities, and the central government, the Lombardy 
government allowed itself to be overpowered by Rome’s unrealistic and dismissive response to 
the outbreak.  
Putting Lombardy’s Case into Perspective 
 Since they were the first to suffer the virus’s devastating impact, the Lombardy regional 
government deserves some leniency. Furthermore, there were numerous problematic factors 
complicating their policymaking process, including unbending castigation from Rome, the 
virus’s violent speed, and overwhelming economic concerns. These factors combined with the 
intimidating role played by the civic community, may have been responsible for stymying the 
Lombardy regional government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis. Nevertheless, these factors 
do not make the Lombardian case obsolete. This case suggests that when a crisis is highly 
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intense and the pressure on policymakers is multi-faceted, a high social capital level can 
potentially make governance more intimidating, thus contributing to ineffective policy responses. 
 Choosing a political stance that could potentially lock ten million people in their homes 
and destroy the economy the entire nation relied on, all in spite of the Prime Minister’s wishes, 
seemed simply too daunting for Lombardy’s government. So, knowing the political 
consequences, the regional government did not effectively contest Rome’s misinformation.  
In their highly civic community, the greater political accountability fostered by social capital 
may have paralyzed Lombardy’s government when they needed to act aggressively. It is quite 
possible that if the regional government knew it was not subject to the immense political 
accountability created by social capital, it would have acted faster to shut down Rome's lies and 
then Lombardy itself. Sure enough, this policy approach of inaction was not satisfactory to the 
region’s civic community. In the aftermath of the pandemic’s first wave, Governor Fontana 
faced a class-action lawsuit for mishandling of the crisis, and his dream of becoming Prime 
Minister was crushed.161 
The Venetian Case 
 Social capital also appears to have been an underlying influence on the Venetian 
government’s COVID-19 policy approach and effectiveness. While Lombardy’s case seems to 
place social capital in a harmful position, Veneto’s case can potentially vindicate it. Judging 
from the Veneto government’s policy approach to the crisis, social capital may have played a 
basic yet noteworthy role in influencing the government’s policy approach and the success of 
that approach.  
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 At a foundational level, social capital may have assisted the Venetian regional 
government in its fight against COVID-19. Unlike Lombardy, where social capital’s threat of 
accountability intimidated the government to the point where it became indecisive and elusive, 
Veneto’s regional government took a political gamble by enforcing widespread coronavirus 
mitigation policies. These policies became widely known as the “Veneto Model.” While the 
Veneto Model’s testing, tracing, and quarantine programs were effective in and of themselves, 
part of the reason they worked so well was the Venetian communities’ full cooperation with the 
regional government. Social capital’s horizontal networks of trust were essential in this citizen-
government cooperation. In defining social capital, Putnam saw trust as an “essential 
component.”162 He discovered that civic traditions in Northern Italy had produced a historical 
repertoire for mutual trust between the citizens within the civic community and between the 
citizens and regional government.163 So when Veneto utilized a community-based COVID-19 
policy, this policy activated the region’s long tradition of horizontal, mutually-beneficial 
collaboration between the government and civic community. 
 Evidence of social capital’s influence on the Veneto government’s policy approach and 
effectiveness can be identified in two instances. Firstly, it may have reassured the regional 
government that the civic community’s collective capabilities would help facilitate the Veneto 
Model’s success. Second, when the Venetian government acted upon this reassurance by 
implementing the Veneto Model, their predictions became reality and their community-based 
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Social Capital’s Influence on Veneto’s Government Policy Response 
 The first way social capital aided the regional government was by making its community-
based policy response feasible in the first place. Since networks of civic engagement in Veneto 
developed norms of collective action and civic collaboration, social capital's rich history in the 
region subtly reassured the Venetian government that their constituents would dutifully play their 
part in the fight against coronavirus. This reassurance encouraged the government to craft an 
ambitious policy that would only succeed if the public cooperated fully. On the other hand, if 
Veneto had a low social capital level, this norm of civic collaboration between the people and 
government would not be present. If the government proceeded with a community-based policy 
anyways, the policy would struggle to succeed, as it would be difficult for the residents to 
overcome the "barriers of suspicion and shirking."164  
Leading up to the Veneto Model 
 When Veneto health officials discovered their own cluster of coronavirus infections in 
the city of Vò on February 21st – only a day after patient one’s diagnosis – the region’s 
government in Venice responded quickly by locking down the infected hospital and testing all 
3,300 town residents.165 Veneto Governor Luca Zaia told national media that he was “ready to 
take all measures to stem contagion, including closing all of the region’s schools and 
businesses.”166 On the next day, the Veneto government carried out tests on staff and patients in 
every Venetian hospital.167  
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 When the outbreak claimed its third victim on February 23rd, in addition to the central 
government’s decree, Governor Zaia independently shut down all of Veneto’s churches and 
schools until March 1st.168 When business owners lobbied Veneto’s government hoping to 
remain open, Governor Zaia briefly reversed his position on the virus to align himself with 
fellow Northern League party member Governor Fontana, calling the virus a “media pandemic” 
and blaming the press for sensationalizing the crisis.169  
 For a moment, Veneto’s government appeared to be going down the same road of 
inaction as Lombardy’s. But when the virus continued spreading on February 24th, Governor 
Zaia, advised by Andrea Crisanti, one of the nation’s leading virologists, began issuing region-
wide COVID-19 policies to treat the sick and locate the virus. The policies crafted by Veneto’s 
government became known as the Veneto Model, the international gold-standard strategy for 
coronavirus mitigation.170 The timeline for the Venetian regional government’s policy response 
to COVID-19 can be pictured in Table 3.3. 







(1) Feb. 21: Vò is isolated and all residents are tested.  
(2) Feb. 23: Schools and churches are closed. 
(3) Feb. 24: Veneto Model is implemented in all towns with COVID-19 clusters.  
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The Veneto Model Policy Package 
 The Veneto Model was created for two primary purposes; to safeguard the healthcare 
system and locate the virus before it could spread. To strengthen treatment capabilities, regional 
health authorities chose numerous large hospitals to specialize only in COVID-19 treatment.171 
Healthcare workers quickly transported non-COVID-19 patients from these designated hospitals 
to smaller treatment facilities.172 This policy had four positive effects. First, separating infected 
and non-infected patients helped prevent hospitals from becoming the centers of transmission.173 
Second, by clearly designating which facilities contained infectious COVID-19 patients, this 
policy removed the ambiguity of where COVID-19 was, saving Venetian healthcare workers’ 
lives. Third, with COVID-19 allocated to specific hospitals, healthcare workers could more 
effectively centralize medical resources to where they were needed most, which improved their 
ability to care for patients with severe symptoms.174 Finally, hospitals now had adequate room to 
dramatically increase ICU capacity and store the necessary number of ventilators.175 Thanks to 
this precautionary measure by the Veneto government, Veneto’s hospitals did not become the 
grim picture of Lombardy’s, where healthcare workers were resorting to drawing lines on the 
ground to mark contaminated areas.176 
 The second half of the Veneto Model was dedicated to proactively locating and isolating 
the virus before it could infect large swaths of the population. To do this, Veneto’s regional 
government enacted a widespread testing and tracing program. In areas containing clusters of 
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COVID-19 infections, the regional government built drive-through rapid-testing facilities and 
ordered all residents in the area to receive tests.177 This directive was combined with a highly 
comprehensive contact-tracing regiment to hunt down the disease.178 Once an infected person 
was found, rather than immediately sending them to a hospital, the government ordered them to 
isolate and quarantine at home.179 If urgent care was necessary, health officials transported the 
infected individual to a designated hospital. The regional government also encouraged general 
healthcare practitioners to switch from in-person appointments to safer telehealth meetings.180 
Rather than chasing the virus, Veneto’s government crafted policy to get in front of the virus, 
where it could be isolated and cordoned off from infecting the population.  
Social Capital Influence in the Veneto Model’s Effectiveness 
 Once the government enacted the Veneto Model policies, social capital may have helped 
facilitate widespread community cooperation in two primary ways. First, once Veneto began 
messaging clearly to its citizenry, social capital’s norm of reciprocity convinced Venetians that 
their government was making the correct policy decisions, encouraging them to follow the 
government’s guidelines. Second, the region’s dense associational networks aided the Venetian 
population in overcoming the policy’s collective action problem, facilitating widespread 
participation. Since the success of the government’s testing and tracing policies largely depended 
on the full cooperation of the people, social capital was an essential tool that may have saved 
countless lives in Veneto. 
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 Without social capital’s norms of reciprocity, the Venetian population might have quickly 
dismissed the Veneto Model as ridiculous. At first glance and in the heat of the moment, the 
regional government’s policies probably seemed utterly counterintuitive. As they watched the 
fatalities from COVID-19 steadily increase, infected Venetians probably questioned why the best 
way for them to fight coronavirus was at home rather than a hospital. Many also may have 
questioned why it was necessary to receive a COVID-19 test even if they were asymptomatic 
and had never contacted anyone infected. Additionally, Governor Zaia’s initial skepticism of the 
virus likely detracted from the population’s confidence in his policies.  
 But unlike Lombardy, Veneto’s government began to message clearly about its plan, and 
the Venetian people cooperated. While the extreme urgency of the crisis can partially explain 
this behavior, the root of the population's participation could possibly be seen in the region's high 
social capital level. Veneto contains a reliable network of reciprocity, a mutually-beneficial 
relationship between the civic community and regional government, balanced on an equally 
horizontal plane. Veneto’s citizens held their government officials to high standards, and they 
expected the government to perform diligently in crises. So, when Governor Zaia released the 
Veneto Model's policy directives, his region’s citizens, basing their judgment on a long history 
of civic collaboration, expeditiously followed his orders. 
Why Veneto’s Government Acted and Lombardy’s Did Not 
 When comparing Veneto’s policy response with Lombardy’s, the differing situational 
factors must be clearly addressed. Unlike Lombardy’s outbreak which was spreading violently 
across ten municipalities, Veneto’s outbreak was initially isolated to one municipality, giving 
policymakers more room to breathe. Unlike Lombardy’s government, which buckled under the 
uniquely intense pressure, situational factors permitted Veneto’s government to be more level-
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headed and rational. As a result, Veneto proudly chose to defy Rome because it was confident 
that its policy would be effective.  
 The regional government’s confidence for the Veneto Model’s success arose from three 
sources, two of which were exclusive to Veneto, and can help explain why the regional 
government took direct policy action. The first source of policy confidence comes from the 
region’s long history of viral diseases. Since the region contains Venice, one of the most 
historically essential port cities of all European history, the Venetian people have a long history 
of viral epidemics and effective quarantine policies.181 In fact, the word “quarantine” originates 
from the Venetian word “quarantena” meaning “40 days,” the amount of time that ships 
suspected of carrying plagues were isolated in Venice’s port.182 Second, after the outbreak was 
detected in Vò, Veneto’s regional Governor appointed Italy’s leading virologist to be in charge 
of the region’s mass-testing program.183 These two exclusive sources of confidence combined 
with the crisis’s vastly different intensity levels between Veneto and Lombardy, can clarify why 
the two regional governments’ policy approaches to COVID-19 crisis were so dissimilar. 
 At first, social capital’s intimidating threat of political accountability likely had the same 
effect on Veneto’s regional government as it had on Lombardy’s, as both Lombardian and 
Venetian governments faced the decision of either siding with the placid central government or 
taking the virus seriously by executing proactive policies. However, Veneto’s case differs 
because the regional government overcame the accountability-induced hesitancy. The civic 
community’s norms of reciprocity and acceptable behavior, coupled with a longstanding mutual 
trust between the government and its people, reassured Veneto’s policymakers that its citizens 
 




could overcome any crisis-induced collective action problem. As a result of this encouragement, 
the regional government knew it could rely on its civic community, so it invented a community-
based, region-wide policy to contain the virus. Sure enough, after implementing the Veneto 
Model, the region’s citizens collectively mobilized and participated in the demanding testing, 
tracing, and quarantine guidelines. As a result of his policy’s success, the virus did not hit 
Veneto nearly as hard as Lombardy, and Governor Luca Zaia became a national hero.184 
The Calabrian and Campanian Cases 
 Compared to their northern counterparts, the first wave of coronavirus spared the 
southern regions of Calabria and Campania. Largely thanks to the national lockdown declared by 
the March 9th decree, both populations remained virtually unscathed by the end of the 
pandemic’s first three months. While the virus’s damage in the two regions was far less 
compared to Lombardy and Veneto, the regional governments’ policy responses to COVID-19 
are still noteworthy. 
 These two regional governments can be analyzed together because both regions’ social 
capital deficiencies appear to have influenced their governments’ policy approaches in analogous 
ways. The governments’ responses to the crisis suggest that low social capital does not 
invariably hinder decisive and effective governance. Instead, it appears that low social capital 
can produce vulnerabilities that may serve as an underlying motivation for governments to 
formulate and implement assertive policy responses. In the Calabrian and Campanian cases, 
there are two ways that low social capital levels might have compelled the governments to 
respond quickly and effectively to the crisis. First, without social capital’s historical trend of 
effective governance, both regions’ public health infrastructures were especially vulnerable to 
 
184 Johnson, “Political Hero of Italy’s Coronavirus Crisis Takes Shine off Salvini.” 
 66 
the crisis. Second, without social capital’s interconnected networks of trust, the regions’ 
communities lacked collective action competence, making the citizens less likely to overcome 
collective action dilemmas introduced by the crisis. As a result of this collective disadvantage, 
regional governments may have been doubtful that citizens would collectively participate in 
lockdown protocols. Due to these two weaknesses generated by social capital’s absence, both 
regions were more vulnerable to the crisis, which prompted regional governments use assertive 
and effective policy responses. 
 While both regional governments responded in ways that demonstrate these two social 
capital-induced influences, each influence has one respective region where the influence’s 
evidence is more pronounced and noticeable. The Calabrian regional government demonstrates 
the urgent and effective policy approach to protect the vulnerable public health infrastructure. 
The Campanian regional government’s policy response is more emblematic of the influence 
stemming from the citizen’s collective action incompetence.  
Defending the Public Health Infrastructure: The Calabrian Government Response 
 During the first wave of coronavirus, the Calabria regional government performed 
valiantly. With a healthcare system drowning in debt and the highest youth unemployment in 
Italy, the region was already in a state of crisis long before COVID-19 entered the picture. When 
the outbreak began in Lombardy, the only defense Calabria's population had from utter 
catastrophe was their regional government led by Governor Jole Santelli. In both southern 
regions, but more specifically Calabria, low social capital levels contributed to weakening the 
public health infrastructure, so when the crisis began, this infrastructural weakness played a 
pivotal role in provoking the regional government to take decisive policy measures in hopes of 
saving their healthcare system from imminent collapse.  
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The Cause of Infrastructural Decay: The ‘Ndrangheta Mafia 
 In the decades leading up to the pandemic, the Calabrian healthcare system was in a 
permanent state of decline.185 Despite Italy’s national healthcare quality ranking highly amongst 
EU countries and 80% of Calabria’s annual budget going to healthcare funding, the average 
Calabrian enjoys 52.9 years of good health, ranking the region’s healthcare quality behind 
Romania and Bulgaria.186 As is the case in Campania, since 2010, the central government has 
directly governed Calabria’s healthcare system.187 Healthcare quality in Calabria is on par with 
the developing world, and when citizens need medical attention, they fly north for 
treatment.188At the start of the pandemic, the region’s hospitals contained less than 150 ICU beds 
for its two million inhabitants.189  
 The cause for Calabria’s impoverished healthcare system lies in the region’s historical 
struggle with organized crime.190 The prevalence of “mafioso” activity in southern Italy’s 
regions, including Calabria, Sicily, and Campania, resulted in widespread governmental 
corruption.191 Over the last thirty years, Calabria’s mafia, the ‘Ndrangheta, has grown to become 
the largest criminal network in Italy, controlling 80% of the European drug market and earning a 
combined annual income of 44 billion euros.192 This estimated revenue makes the ‘Ndrangheta 
worth more than every Mexican cartel combined.193 The organization is decentralized with 
autonomous sects known as “’Ndrines,” all connected by kinship and spread territorially across 
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the region.194 The group even has an internal conflict-resolution committee staffed by 
‘Ndrangheta elders.  
 Since the mid-1990s, when the group first emerged as the nation’s dominant crime 
syndicate, the ‘Ndrangheta criminal network has profited immensely by siphoning funds from 
Calabria’s healthcare system using corrupt regional and municipal government officials.195 The 
younger generation of the ‘Ndrangheta manages this scheme with a business-like profession, and 
some hold degrees from prestigious business schools like the London School of Economics and 
Harvard.196 Taking advantage of the many intermediary parties between the regional 
government, local governments, and hospitals, these sophisticated criminals employ an 
extraordinarily complex scheme to funnel money from government spending packages into the 
untraceable international financial sector.197 In addition to revenue from extortion, the mafia uses 
this stolen money to fund the 'Ndrangheta's joint ventures in international drug trafficking.198 
Due to the group’s widespread influence throughout the region, combatting this fraud is an 
insurmountable challenge for the Calabrian government. 
Social Capital and the Mafia’s Rise 
 At the very root of Calabria’s healthcare and organized crime crisis is the region’s 
centuries-long social capital drought. When Putnam observed Italy’s southern regions, he 
discovered an inverse correlation between social capital and the prevalence of organized crime 
networks. Over the last millennia, distrust between community members developed from a 








and public goods, and the second was constant lawlessness creating pervasive uncertainty in all 
community transactions.199 As a result of these competition and uncertainty trends, Calabria’s 
population never formed the trust-based mutual-aid societies akin to those in the North.200 The 
spirit of communal solidarity that saturated the North’s civic communities never formed in 
Calabria.201 Instead, slogans like “damned is he who trusts another” were historically ingrained 
into the minds of southern Italy’s un-civic community members.202  
 Rather than horizontally trusting one’s neighbor and government, the Calabrian people 
sought refuge in a vertical hierarchy of exploitation and dependence.203 As a consequence of 
their deep distrust of one another, citizens of Calabria became more dependent on aid from 
people above them in the community hierarchy. But since the regional government was always 
unreliable and ineffective, citizens were left searching for alternative sources of aid and 
patronage. As a result, the mafia filled in the void left by the government. With the government 
too incompetent to deter the mafia or do its job and render the mafia obsolete, Calabria’s citizens 
became wholly dependent on criminals. This dependence, in turn, raised the mafia’s status past 
the government’s, further lowering the trust between the citizens and their government 
officials.204 By the beginning of the 21st century, the ‘Ndrangheta became so emboldened that 
they not only openly stole from the Calabrian people, they stole from the regional government, 
and when Rome intervened in 2010, they stole from them too.  
 The community interconnectedness of the ‘Ndrangheta means that Calabria does not lack 
all forms of social capital. There is a civic community in this region, but it is solely comprised of 
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bonding social capital. Bonding social capital connects community members from a 
homogeneous group, including ethnic groups, or in this case, family networks. Bonding social 
capital is cultivated by the ‘Ndrangheta’s complex and comprehensive organization built upon 
family ties. Bonding social capital is enough to get the average Calabrian by. When in desperate 
need, they can go to the ‘Ndrangheta for help, which they routinely did after withstanding the 
economic damage brought by the pandemic’s first wave.205 But bonding social capital alone is 
not enough for true social capital to accumulate. The first form of social capital that Calabria 
lacks is bridging social capital, the civic interconnections between heterogeneous communities 
crossing socioeconomic classes. The second form that Calabria lacks is linking social capital, the 
horizontal forms of trust and reciprocity that connects citizens with their government officials. 
These bridging and linking social capital subgroups set the civic communities in Lombardy and 
Veneto ahead of Calabria’s. With bridging, linking, and bonding social capital, citizens can 
develop the class-cutting mutually beneficial norms of behavior that produce the collectively 
competent civic communities found in the North.   
Evidence of Social Capital-Induced Vulnerability: An Urgently Decisive Government Response 
 On February 23rd, once Rome placed eleven infected municipalities in lockdown, 
Governor Santelli quickly addressed her region. Calling the outbreak in the North an urgent 
threat to Calabria’s healthcare and economy, she reminded the region’s population that they 
needed to collaborate and comply with the incoming COVID-19 mitigation policies.206 One day 
later, Governor Santelli passed an ordinance to close all schools and universities until March 
2nd.207 As the situation in the North worsened, this closure was promptly extended. Additionally, 
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Governor Santelli’s February 24th ordinance directed all Calabrians arriving home from the Red 
Zone to immediately contact health authorities and quarantine at home for two weeks.208 On 
February 28th, Calabria health officials located the first suspected case of COVID-19, and as a 
result, the regional government met with Prime Minister Conte’s cabinet so they could discuss 
Calabria’s unparalleled vulnerability to the virus.209 
 Eight days later, on March 7th, Governor Santelli took to social media to ask citizens to 
“leave the house only if necessary.”210 On March 8th, to address the mass exodus of infected 
northerners to the South, Calabria’s regional government shut its borders.211 Once the borders 
were closed and Rome enacted the national lockdown, the next assignment for Santelli’s 
government was to fortify the healthcare system. On March 11th, the government approved an 
emergency plan to increase the stockpile of beds by 400, recruit 300 additional healthcare 
workers, and coordinate with provincial governments to establish hospitals exclusively for 
COVID-19 patients.212 These decisive policy responses, which can be viewed together in Table 
3.4, suggest that the regional government knew that it could not rely on the healthcare system to 
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(1) Feb. 24: Ordinance closes all schools and universities. 
(2) Feb. 28: First case confirmed, officials demand a meeting with Prime Minister Conte. 
(3) March 8: Calabrian border is shut down. 
(4) March 11: Emergency ICU expansion plan is activated.  
(5) March 20: Calabria receives support from the Italian Military. 
 
Addressing the Unique Situation in Calabria 
 While the findings concerning the Calabrian case are fascinating, they may not be as 
generalizable as the findings gathered from the other regions in this study. The ‘Ndrangheta 
might be a rare example of an untouchable criminal syndicate with a business team of all-stars 
and a surveillance network comparable to the Gestapo. Nevertheless, the Calabrian case further 
substantiates Putnam’s thesis; social capital engenders good governance, and without it, 
institutions are faced with greater challenges. When institutions struggle to address these 
challenges, their infrastructures struggle too. So, when a crisis occurs, governments knows they 
cannot count on the infrastructure to be their saving grace. As a result of this heightened 
vulnerability, governments might feel more inclined to act urgently, decisively, and effectively.   
The Campanian Government’s Healthcare Epidemic 
 While the fragile infrastructure may have been less of a driving motivation, Campania’s 
feeble healthcare system also contributed to the Campanian regional government’s choice of an 
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assertive and effective policy solution similar to the Calabrian government. A few years prior to 
the 2020 pandemic, after receiving numerous corruption charges, Rome placed the Campania 
government on a ten-year healthcare spending prohibition. This spending prohibition made 
simple tasks like providing enough seasonal flu vaccines difficult, so a COVID-19 outbreak akin 
to Lombardy’s or Veneto’s would quickly destroy the Campania healthcare system.213 At the 
beginning of Italy’s pandemic, Campania’s ICU capacity was dismal, and the region’s health 
officials struggled to stay organized. With no clear orders from the government, healthcare 
workers quarantined infected individuals in whatever hospital rooms where free to spare.214 
Furthermore, the population’s access to healthcare was extremely limited. Many Campania 
residents did not live in the vicinity of hospitals or even general medical practitioners.215 
 To bolster the region’s feeble healthcare system, Campania Governor Vincenzo De Luca 
successfully persuaded Rome to end Campania’s ten-year healthcare spending prohibition. Next, 
on March 7th, the government ordered five hospitals to specialize only in coronavirus 
treatment.216 The following day, policymakers allocated 30 million euros to buy ventilators and 
increase the region’s ICU capacity.217 By the second week of March, Campanian officials 
prepared to boost ICU beds from 320 to 500.218 Seeing how under-equipped Campania hospitals 
were, many government officials used their own money to supply healthcare workers with 
personal protective equipment.219 Some officials directly contacted the Chinese government, 
hoping to organize a transaction of medical equipment.220 These urgent and decisive responses 
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indicate that like Calabria’s government officials, Campania’s government officials were fully 
aware of the their infrastructure’s vulnerability, which in turn, made them respond assertively to 
the crisis. 
Coercing Collective Action: The Campanian Regional Government Response 
 The Campania regional government’s policy response can also provide insight into how 
governments in areas with low social capital levels respond to a crisis. In a crisis where 
governments require full policy compliance from the public, Campania’s case suggests that if a 
community has little social capital, the government may be more inclined to use aggressive 
policy responses like threats and coercion, in hopes of forcing widespread policy adherence. 
Unlike highly civic communities, in a community with low social capital, like Campania’s and 
Calabria’s, citizens typically struggle to successfully solve collective action problems. So, when 
this community faces a crisis like a pandemic, government officials might feel the need to 
employ more coercive strategies to solve the citizens’ collective action problem artificially.  
 The trust between Campania’s people and government operates in the opposite direction 
of Lombardy’s and Veneto’s. While the communities in northern Italy trust one another and 
perceive themselves as aligned in a horizontal network with their government, Campanians are 
more hesitant to place their trust in one another. Furthermore, they view their government 
through a vertical, hierarchical network of patronage and opportunism. As a result, northern 
regions are typically better suited to solve collective action dilemmas than southern regions like 
Campania. In Veneto, for instance, the COVID-19 collective action problem was participation in 
the government's ambitious testing and tracing mandates. Here in Campania and Calabria as 
well, the COVID-19 collective action problem was participation in the lockdown. In the absence 
of social capital, for Campania, this collective action dilemma was solved not as much by the 
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people as it was by the government. In Campania, citizens struggled to follow the lockdown 
measures, forcing the Governor to use exceedingly draconian policies and coercive rhetoric to 
facilitate policy compliance.   
 From the start of the lockdown to the Phase 3 reopening, Campania Governor Vincenzo 
De Luca expressed open signs of distrust in his people. Partly explained by the lack of social 
capital, this distrust was the government’s driving motivation to implement coercive rhetoric and 
policies. Knowing that Campanians would struggle with the lockdown’s collective action 
problem, Governor De Luca employed aggressive language and policies to coerce his citizens 
into participating in the lockdown. Governor De Luca might have also been more comfortable 
using this coercive rhetoric because he felt his citizens lacked the collective capability to 
effectively hold him accountable in the future. 
           Evidence of low social capital’s influence on the Campanian government’s response can 
be pinpointed in two areas. First, it can be seen in the regional government’s ordinances to 
tighten lockdown restrictions, as well as the regional Governor’s rationale for implementing 
these draconian restrictions. Second, low social capital’s influence can be identified in Governor 
De Luca’s performatively coercive public rhetoric combined with his heavy reliance on law 
enforcement and to coerce and deter collective action. These two behaviors suggest that an 
instinctive and underlying distrust made the Campanian regional government hesitant to 
passively assume their citizens would willfully and collectively comply with the lockdown 
mandates. Therefore, this suspicion, coupled with the community’s historical incompetence in 
the face of collective action dilemmas may have compelled the government to solve this 
particular collective action problem coercively.  
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Evidence of Distrust: Increasing the Lockdown Restrictions 
 When they received word of an outbreak in Lombardy, Campania government officials 
feared that the virus would soon hit their region.221 In the following days, cases connected to 
Lombardy began trickling into the region. On February 27th – six days after Lombardy’s patient 
one – Governor De Luca mobilized a task force of epidemiologists to begin formulating a 
comprehensive contact tracing system.222 Two days later, coronavirus infections in Campania 
rose to thirteen, with nine in Naples, and the remaining four cases divided between three other 
municipalities.223 Acting with urgency, Governor De Luca ordered the closure of all schools and 
universities, intending to reopen them on March 1st.224 When the March 8th decree leaked to the 
media and infected Lombardy citizens fled to the South, Governor De Luca and six other 
southern regions, including Calabria, immediately enacted policies to force all northern evacuees 
into a two-week quarantine upon arrival.225 The central government responded with hostility, 
claiming that Governor De Luca and his colleagues were disobeying orders.226  
 A day later, the central government flipped its prior position, initiating a national 
lockdown. To Governor De Luca, however, Rome’s March 9th lockdown policy was not strict 
enough. Believing that the central government's decree was overly vague and lenient, Governor 
De Luca passed two aggressive ordinances on March 13th.227 The first ordinance banned all 
walking in public without an urgent reason, and the second closed all forms of take-away food 
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unless the food was pre-packaged by a masked employee.228 These two ordinances set an 
aggressive tone for the Campania regional government. Violators were subjected to three months 
in jail, a fine of more than 200 euros, and a mandatory two-week quarantine.229  
 The Governor’s motivation for enacting these policies can traced back to a deep distrust, 
and this distrust can be observed in his public addresses. To explain his rationale for banning 
public walking and most take-away food services, Governor De Luca told local media; “We are 
unfortunately forced to make these ordinances, because there are 90% of citizens who have 
understood that the situation is serious, but there is 10% of irresponsible people, who must be 
neutralized and put in a position to do no harm.”230 Later in the interview, the Governor stated 
“with ordinances we can regulate 99% of the problems, but then people’s brains must be put into 
operation. Sometimes it feels like you're dealing with people who look like First Communion 
kids.”231 These statements, coupled with the government’s draconian policies, suggest that an 
underlying sense of distrust was a noteworthy motivation for the regional government’s decisive 
policy response in to the COVID-19 crisis.  
Evidence of Collective Action Struggles: Coercive Enforcement and Rhetoric 
 Once the regional government implemented these strict lockdown mandates, the regional 
government immediately called upon Rome to dispatch the military to help law enforcement 
ensure widespread collective action success.232 On March 20th, after persistently requesting 
Rome to “militarize” neighborhoods, Governor De Luca received military support to aide police 
in enforcing obedience.233  
 
228 Ruccia. 






 By May, the Governor was strong-arming the public with vivid threats, earning himself 
the title of “The Sheriff.”234 During a May 2nd public address, Governor De Luca warned 
Campanians with the following statement: 
I will go out with a club in my hand, I will hide behind the walls and I will appear as soon as I 
see someone wandering without an urgent reason: a blow to the head and I leave him dead on 
the ground.235 
 
After this, Governor De Luca told graduation party planners that if they violated his 
government’s lockdown orders, he would dispatch police officers armed with flamethrowers.236  
While the crisis’s urgency can somewhat explain this violent and coercive rhetoric, the 
underlying reason for this policy approach may have been a historically-embedded feeling of 
doubt and suspicion. If the Governor was wholly confident in his people's loyalty to his 
lockdown policies, he would not have felt compelled to coerce them so harshly. Unlike Veneto, 
where both citizens and government looked to their long history of collaboration and victory 
over collective endeavors, Campanians and their government officials had little reason to expect 
a resounding and effortless triumph over this collective action problem. Because everyone 
expected others to violate the guidelines, the government immediately resorted to third-party 
enforcement techniques. In the end, rather than dutifully obeying the government as part of their 
social contract, many in Campania followed the lockdown's rules out of self-preservation and the 
sheer fact that Governor De Luca sat at the top of the government's hierarchy. Nevertheless, the 
government’s policy response of coercion was successful, and the region was sheltered from the 
crisis. The Campania government’s COVID-19 policy responses can be pictured in Table 3.5. 
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(1) Feb. 27: Governor mobilizes COVID-19 Task Force. 
(2) Feb. 29: Closes all schools and universities. 
(3) March 13: Passes ordinances to ban public walking and take-away food. 
(4) March 20: Campania receives support from Italian Military. 
 
The Calabrian Government’s Pleas for Collective Action and Civic Collaboration 
 While their public statements were not as rambunctious and performative as the 
Campanian Governor’s, Calabrian policymakers also exhibited signs of distrust and doubt in the 
citizens’ collective capabilities. But rather than emphatically coercing the public, Calabria 
Governor Jole Santelli constantly pleaded for collaboration, often taking to Facebook to make 
statements like, “We are a people, who, during difficult times, can transform individualism into a 
great sense of community.”237While the government’s threatening rhetoric was more reserved, 
the Calabrian government still relied on tools of coercion. On March 20th, the military arrived in 
Calabria and Governor Santelli announced that like Campania’s government, the Calabrian 
government would be banning all public walking.238 Throughout the Calabrian lockdown, 
numerous videos went viral depicting local Mayors and politicians taking to the street and 
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shouting at people who were blatantly violating the lockdown rules.239 In contrast, viral videos 
from northern Italy showed people playing music from their balconies in a spirit of solidarity.240 
Putting the Calabrian and Campanian Cases Together 
 In both Calabria and Campania, social capital’s underlying influence on government 
responses may have contributed to their decisive, aggressive, and overall effective policy 
responses to the COVID-19 crisis. As seen in these two regions’ government policy solutions, 
social capital’s scarcity may have helped motivate policymakers to take more involved and 
assertive measures to adequately protect their citizens and health infrastructures. The un-civic 
community’s underlying influence on policymakers in these regions came from two sources; a 
historically ineffective government leading to infrastructural decay, and a long-standing 
repertoire of distrust and collective action failures. 
 Unlike Lombardy and Veneto, where civic communities generated effective governance, 
producing reliable infrastructures, in Calabria and Campania, the lack of social capital produced 
ineffective governance and infrastructural decay. Secondly, unlike the North, where social 
capital established a mutual trust between the government and its citizens, Campania and 
Calabria enjoyed little mutual trust, which produced a historical repertoire for unsuccessful 
collective endeavors. As a result of these two pervasive forces, both regional governments knew 
they needed to take more assertive policy actions to stem the virus. As a result of these actions, 
the COVID-19 pandemic spared the regions. Governor De Luca became a national celebrity for 
his no-nonsense castigation of lockdown violators, and in September, he smoothly won 
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reelection with a whopping seventy percent of the popular vote.241 In Calabria, Governor 
Santelli, who had been fighting cancer for years, unfortunately passed away in October.242 
Conclusion 
 While it did not fully determine their responses, it does appear that social capital’s 
conditions played underlying roles in each regional government’s policy response to COVID-19. 
The findings from the two high social capital regions, Lombardy and Veneto, suggest that the 
civic community can both help and hurt policy decisiveness and general institutional efficacy 
during a crisis. Lombardy’s case suggests that social capital’s promise of future accountability 
can potentially impede decisive policy action. On the other hand, as seen in Veneto’s case, when 
a government in a high social capital area responds to a crisis, if the policy response taps into a 
historical source of collective action success, the civic community can help facilitate policy 
effectiveness. In the regions with low social capital, Campania, and Calabria, the social capital 
scarcity might have contributed to the regional governments’ motivation to decisively formulate 
and implement policies that could accommodate the regions’ collective and infrastructural 
disadvantages. These findings indicate that a straightforward correlation of high social capital 
with effective crisis governance, and low social capital with ineffective crisis governance might 
not be entirely accurate. 
A Recap for High Social Capital  
 While significant situational differences made the dilemma far more complicated for 
Lombardy’s government than Veneto’s government, both governments faced a similar 
demanding political decision at the start of the outbreak. On the one hand, the governments could 
independently implement COVID-19 policies, possibly slowing the virus’s contagion but 
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disregarding Rome’s wishes, violating civil liberties and putting their economies in jeopardy. On 
the other hand, the governments could sit back and wait for the overly passive central 
government to act, which ran the risk of allowing the virus to spread uncontrolled throughout the 
populations. Due to both regions’ high social capital, the governments knew their citizens 
expected a high-quality response to the ongoing crisis. If policymakers chose incorrectly, falling 
short of the civic community’s rigorous expectation, the political repercussions would be swift, 
and by the next election, the civic communities would decisively end their careers in office. 
 A combination of factors made Lombardy’s political dilemma far more challenging for 
the government to address rationally. Lombardy was the first region hit by coronavirus, and it 
served as the very epicenter of the outbreak. Within three days from February 20th to February 
23rd, coronavirus had spread across ten municipalities. The virus’s violent spread combined with 
economic concerns, the central government’s interference, and the civic community’s ominous 
threat, all combined to overwhelm policymakers, making the Lombardy government’s policy 
response indecisive and ineffective. As a result, his government may have attempted to 
relinquish policymaking responsibility, permitting important policies to be impaired by Rome, 
and leaving municipal governments and the civic community confused on how to proceed.  
Since Lombardy has a history of civic and governmental collaboration, Governor Fontana could 
have utilized the same successful community-based containment policy that the Venetian 
government used. But the overwhelming pressure from Rome, economists, the civic community, 
and the crisis itself prevented him from this rational course of action.  
 The political dilemma that paralyzed Lombardy’s government was far easier to manage 
for Veneto’s government. With the virus only in one municipality, Venetian policymakers could 
rationally approach the political decision and look at their civic community as a tool rather than a 
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potential punisher. Veneto’s long history of interregional collaboration between the civic 
community and government institutions cultivated a reliable trust between Veneto’s government 
and its people. This tradition of trust reassured policymakers that if they implemented a 
widespread community-based containment measure, the Venetian citizens would fully 
participate. The civic community’s source of policy confidence coupled with two other 
convincing sources was what drove the Venetian government to respond quickly and assertively 
to the crisis. Indeed, when the government enacted the Veneto Model policy package, the 
citizens willfully complied. The policy succeeded in repressing the virus, making Governor Zaia 
a celebrity and national political leader in Italy.  
A Recap for Low Social Capital 
 In Calabria and Campania, low social capital levels may have contributed to both 
governments’ assertive and effective policy responses. This conclusion arises from how social 
capital’s historical absence made the regions more vulnerable to the crisis. First, most clearly 
seen in Calabria’s case, low social capital made the regions more vulnerable to the crisis by 
indirectly contributing to the public health system’s decay. With a historical lack of social capital 
rendering the regional governments ineffective and unreliable, criminal organizations rose to 
power and quickly weakened the public infrastructure. Second, without social capital’s blueprint 
for collective action success, in both regions, governments likely knew that their citizens were 
less capable of solving collective action problems. This collective incompetence was incredibly 
daunting because the COVID-19 lockdown required widespread collective action to be effective. 
The effects of this tradition of distrust and suspicion can be most clearly seen in the Campania 
regional government’s policy response to COVID-19. When the coronavirus arrived in the 
North, the combination of these two low social capital-induced liabilities might have driven the 
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governments to take more aggressive measures in ensuring their regions were safe from the 
deadly virus.   
Proceeding to Chapter Four 
 Now that each of the regional governments’ COVID-19 policy responses have been 
described and analyzed through the lens of social capital, this study can proceed to the fourth 
chapter. Chapter Four will provide a summary of the thesis’s argument and sub-conclusions, an 




CHAPTER FOUR  
 Now that the relationships between the COVID-19 crisis, social capital, and regional 
government responses have been interpreted, this chapter will discuss the overarching claim, 
judge the alternative hypotheses, suggest avenues for future research, and conclude. The first 
section of this chapter will address the main argument that social capital shaped regional 
responses and their efficacy. The thesis demonstrates that, indeed, social capital played an 
underlying role in shaping local responses, and when responses meshed with the region’s social 
capital conditions, they more effectively combatted the crisis.  
The second section of this chapter will touch on the alternative hypotheses posed in 
Chapter One. These alternative hypotheses are intended to help explain what other factors may 
have influenced regional governments’ policy responses to the pandemic. The first alternative 
hypothesis (AH1) assumes that regions containing older and densely settled populations had 
more assertive regional governments. The second alternative hypothesis (AH2) posits that the 
aggressiveness of regional government responses depended on their healthcare systems’ strength. 
Finally, the third alternative hypothesis (AH3) correlates high-right wing support with slow 
policy responses. The third section will summarize the four sub-conclusions regarding the 
specific ways high and low social capital levels subtly influenced COVID-19 policymaking.  
 The fourth section will propose ways scholars can study this perspective of social capital 
in the future. As it pertains to all democratic institutions, social capital is a uniquely 
comprehensive concept. Since Putnam conceived it, political scientists have analyzed the theory 
in many scenarios. As of now, it appears the COVID-19 crisis is coming to a close, and there are 
undoubtedly many other ways to apply social capital to governance in this period. These four 
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Italian regions’ policy responses during the first months of the crisis only provide a glimpse into 
the greater conclusions that have yet to be uncovered.   
The final section will conclude by discussing the broader implications and goals of this 
study. This thesis has been written in hopes of accomplishing two goals. The first goal is to 
contribute to the expansion of social capital theory and its relevance to democratic governance. 
The second goal has been to extract meaningful lessons from the COVID-19 crisis so that 
political science can further prepare democratic institutions for effectively managing future 
emergencies.  
Discussing the Argument’s Claims 
Did Social Capital Influence Policy Approaches? 
The conclusions from Chapter Three indicate that social capital played an underlying role 
in shaping regional government policy approaches. While regional social capital did not impact 
Rome’s decrees, it likely influenced the regional governments’ approaches. For instance, 
Lombardy and Veneto’s regional governments were hugely relevant in the 17 days between the 
outbreak and Rome’s national “I Stay Home” decree. In the South, due to their region’s unique 
vulnerabilities, Campania and Calabria’s regional governments were relevant throughout the 
entire first wave.  
Whenever these regional governments were in the position to create COVID-19 policies, 
social capital may have subtly driven the policymaking strategies. The underlying influence of 
social capital can be interpreted in all four regions. In both regions containing high social capital 
levels, the governments may have felt pressure from their civic community’s high expectations. 
Out of fear of being held accountable by highly engaged citizens, government officials only 
wanted to enact policy solutions that were certain to fulfill expectations. The Lombardian and 
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Venetian governments responded differently to this pressure, but nevertheless, it appears that this 
influence was present and pervasive. In the South, as the Campanian and Calabrian governments 
developed their policy solutions to the crisis, both governments appear to have been affected by 
their civic communities’ weaknesses. The two Governors’ public statements and policies suggest 
that policymakers knew they could not rely on support from their civic communities. Moreover, 
they knew that their region’s organized crime and related weak bridging and linking social 
capital, had left them with crumbling public health infrastructures. This disadvantage may have 
convinced them that urgent and involved governmental action was necessary to combat COVID-
19 effectively. In all four regions, social capital appears to have played an underlying role in 
regional government policy approaches. 
Did Social Capital Accommodation Produce Effective Policies? 
Moreover, where regional policymakers chose policies that meshed with their social 
capital conditions, pandemic containment was more successful. In Veneto, Campania, and 
Calabria, policymakers enacted solutions that suited the strengths and weaknesses of their civic 
communities. Venetian officials blended their policies with their social capital by choosing a 
community-centric approach to take advantage of the civic community’s collectivizing power. 
Campanian and Calabrian officials merged their policies with social capital conditions by hastily 
responding to protect their fragile healthcare systems and relying on coercion to account for the 
community’s collective action weakness.  
Lombardy’s intense, early exposure to the pandemic makes it an outlier in some respects. 
However, it still appears that the government failed to contain the virus partly because 
policymakers did not merge their COVID-19 solutions with the region’s social capital 
conditions. Like Veneto, Lombardy’s civic community was fully capable of providing collective 
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support to the regional government in its crusade against the pandemic. Unfortunately, in the 
crucial weeks immediately following the outbreak, the Lombardy Government did not 
effectively mobilize this civic community. Due to concerns about political accountability and the 
immense pressure applied by Rome, the government failed to implement policies that took 
advantage of the ready and willing civic community. Instead, Lombardy stood down from the 
policymaking burden and gave the Prime Minister a louder and misleading voice. The regional 
government’s withdrawal coupled with Rome’s overly passive messaging led to poor healthcare 
policies and widespread confusion from municipalities and citizens. This confusion left the 
region’s civic communities unsure how to react to the crisis, causing a scattered and disunified 
public response. As a result of this policy disaster, COVID-19 devastated the region, and the 
Lombardy government fell short of the civic community’s standard of quality. In the wave’s 
aftermath, the Lombardy civic community mobilized to hold their Governor to account. 
In each of these four case studies, it appears that when regional governments modified 
their policy responses to address the capabilities of their civic communities, these policies were 
effective in stemming the pandemic. Social capital not only had an underlying influence on 
regional government policy approaches, but it could have also played a role in determining 
policy success.  
Judging the Alternative Hypotheses 
A region’s social capital level was not the only factor shaping policy responses to the 
2020 pandemic. During the outbreak’s critical first weeks, the regional governments needed to 
form their policies around many different components. While this study has suggested that social 
capital played an underlying role in the regional government’s policy responses, there were 
undoubtedly other variables at play.  
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The first alternative hypothesis maintains that Italian regions containing older and 
densely settled populations had governments that responded aggressively to the virus. COVID-
19’s higher mortality rate for older age subsects, as well as its high rate of transmission can 
imply that these two variables were significant for regional governments as they assessed the 
crisis’s threat. The example of Lombardy and Veneto suggests that population age and density 
was not decisive in shaping responses. Despite having contradictory policy responses, both 
regions contain the same average population age of 46 years old.243 Due to this uniformity, it can 
be inferred that there is little correlation between aggressive policy responses and an older 
average age. The same lack of correlation can be seen in population density, where Lombardy’s 
population density (420/km2) is far higher than Veneto’s (270/km2), yet Lombardy responded 
less aggressively.244 These statistics suggest no correlation between aggressive COVID-19 
policies and average population age and density.  
The second alternative hypothesis speculates that regional responses will depend on the 
strength of the healthcare sector, with weaker health infrastructure leading to more aggressive 
responses to contain the virus’s spread. To judge the veracity of AH2, it makes sense to examine 
the policy responses undertaken by the Campanian and Calabrian governments. Both regions 
contain fragile healthcare infrastructures, and when the crisis arrived in the North, both regional 
governments implemented aggressive COVID-19 policies. So far, the hypothesis is accurate.  
Next, it is important to examine the two northern regions’ policy approaches, since both 
contained robust healthcare systems. While Lombardy’s conservative approach to the virus can 
reflect the government's reliance on their robust public health systems, Veneto’s decisive 
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response is not compatible with this hypothesis. The example of Veneto suggests that a strong 
healthcare system does not always lead to a less aggressive response. 
The third and final alternative hypothesis supposes that regions with comparatively high 
support for right-wing political parties contained governments that responded slowly to the virus. 
As was the case in the United States, policymakers from the political right showed signs of 
hesitation in both accepting the crisis’s pertinence and taking governmental action to combat the 
virus. The regional governments in Lombardy and Veneto are both headed by prominent 
politicians from the right-wing political party known as the Northern League. At the very start of 
the outbreak, Lombardy Governor Atilio Fontana and Veneto Governor Luca Zaia rallied along 
party lines and dismissed the crisis's severity. However, right-wing affiliation did not remain 
decisive. Governor Zaia promptly abandoned his party’s rhetoric and adopted a rigorous policy 
package containing assertive testing, contact tracing, and health care reorganization. Governor 
Zaia’s divergence from his prior allegiance to the Northern League indicates that partisan politics 
may have not played a substantial role in determining COVID-19 responses.  
Sub-Conclusions for Social Capital’s Policymaking Influences 
Age, population density, health infrastructure, and party affiliation do not decisively 
explain regional policy responses. Social capital – while not determinative of responses – does 
seem linked to policy formulation and efficacy. Therefore, Italian regional governments’ 
experiences during the pandemic offer insight into how high and low social capital shape crisis 
governance.  
High Social Capital’s Underlying Influences on Crisis Governance 
The example of Lombardy and Veneto suggests that high social capital influences crisis 
responses in two key ways. First, the Lombardy government’s indecisive policy response 
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indicates that high social capital can potentially stymie assertive government responses. As a 
constant reminder of political accountability, social capital may have raised the stakes of 
policymaking, intimidating both Lombardy and Veneto’s governments as they searched for 
solutions to the crisis. When the two governments approached the cumbersome burden of 
pandemic policymaking, social capital threatened their ability to respond firmly. While Veneto’s 
government broke free from this paralyzing threat, Lombardy’s did not.  
As they witnessed during their time in office and throughout their region’s long civic 
histories, policymakers in Veneto and Lombardy knew that if they failed to address the COVID-
19 crisis correctly, their civic communities would eventually seek vengeance both at the ballot 
box and in the courtrooms. As a result of this looming threat, government officials only 
implemented policies they knew would succeed. This confidence prerequisite can help explain 
the difference between the contrasting policy responses between Lombardy and Veneto. While 
Veneto’s Governor knew his COVID-19 policies would succeed and he would preserve the civic 
community’s support, the Lombardy Governor was not confident that any strong policy response 
would indeed work. This lack of confidence explains why Lombardy conceded policymaking 
responsibility to the central government, despite knowing Rome’s approach was incredibly 
flawed. By letting Rome inherit the task of policymaking, Lombardy government officials 
attempted to avoid accountability so that in the case of policy failure, the civic community’s 
thirst for vengeance would hopefully aim at Rome. 
Second, the Venetian case study indicates that high social capital levels can reassure 
governments that their civic communities will solve collective action dilemmas; therefore, the 
government may be more empowered to implement policies that require widespread community 
participation. Veneto’s case suggests that social capital can contribute to solving the paralyzing 
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problem it initially creates. As mentioned, Veneto’s Governor found confidence in his policy, 
overcoming the social capital-induced accountability threat and initiating the community-centric 
Veneto Model policies. While two other exclusive sources contributed to his confidence, social 
capital might have helped persuade Governor Zaia that his policies would succeed. The region’s 
long civic tradition of mutual trust, norms of reciprocity, and civic engagement assured Veneto’s 
government that its citizens would fully comply with rigorous policies. When the government 
initiated the policies, this speculation became a reality. The Veneto Model policy package saw 
extensive success and became the international gold standard for coronavirus policy. 
Low Social Capital’s Underlying Influence on Crisis Governance 
The two southern regions’ COVID-19 policy responses offer insight into how low social 
capital influences policymaking during a crisis. The shortage of social capital may have 
intensified the urgency for bold governmental action in two ways.  
First, while this source of urgency may be less generalizable than the one concerning 
collective action enforcement, it is nevertheless worth mentioning. The lack of social capital in 
both regions may have contributed to the regions’ public health vulnerability, further motivating 
the governments to use proactive policy solutions to COVID-19. This is especially the case for 
Calabria. Over the past thirty years, organized crime has devastated the healthcare system, and 
the prevalence of these organizations may have been caused by the region’s lack of social 
capital. Knowing they could not expect the health infrastructure to handle an un-mitigated 
outbreak, the government threw itself onto the front lines of the crisis. Without a health system’s 
reliable support, policymakers’ only options were to either take decisive action or stand down 
and allow the virus to devastate the region.  
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The Campanian and Calabrian cases reveal a second way low social capital levels can 
motivate governments to respond decisively to a crisis. the governments knew that they could 
not expect their citizens to overcome the lockdown’s collective action problem singlehandedly. 
As a result, the governments intervened by enforcing strict social distancing mandates and 
relying on coercion to solve the collective action dilemma. In Campania’s case, the Governor 
supplemented this coercive approach by using intensely aggressive rhetoric. If the governments 
did not use this approach, citizens might have freely violated the rules, causing the virus to 
quickly spread and overwhelm the fragile healthcare systems. When the Campania and Calabria 
governments deployed these strict enforcement policies, the policies succeeded, and the regions 
survived the wave. 
Future Research 
 The coronavirus health crisis has posed many new and stimulating questions for political 
science. Of these many questions, this study has attempted to address one that pertains to the 
relationship between social capital and policy responses. Since social capital is used to explain 
general institutional strength, one would assume that crisis governance falls within this general 
domain. This study’s surprising findings highlight how social capital’s institutional benefits may 
not be so cut-and-dry. Social capital influences policy responses and their efficacy, but is not 
determinative of responses. In high social capital areas, social capital can serve as a barrier to 
decisive government action. When the government acts, however, high social capital areas are 
better able to overcome collective action challenges with cooperative action. In low social capital 
areas, the lack of trust and cohesion seems to both politically permit and practically necessitate 
decisive action. 
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There are many exciting ways to pursue further research into social capital and crisis 
policies. First, this thesis has only investigated four regions within one country. There are 
hundreds of other democratic nations that combatted the COVID-19 virus. The performances of 
these nations and their governments have yet to be analyzed in the context of social capital. For 
example, like Italy, the United States government struggled to contain the virus on both the 
federal and state levels. Furthermore, it appears that the relationship between Governor Fontana 
and Prime Minister Conte during the first wave of coronavirus, somewhat reflects the 
relationship between New York Governor Andrew Cuomo and President Donald Trump. It 
would be interesting to examine this relationship, as well as the New York State government’s 
COVID-19 policy response and how social capital was involved.  
A second avenue for future research can assess a crisis’s ability to teach a low social 
capital community how to mobilize collectively. In an interview with Campanian government 
officials, the officials stressed that the first wave of coronavirus invoked a pervasive and 
powerful sense of communal solidarity which citizens had never experienced before.245 While 
the government did need to take coercive measures to produce collective action, it is possible 
that as a result of this policy and the crisis, Campania’s citizens also learned to trust one another. 
On this note, it might be interesting to examine crises as blueprints for collective action, 
potentially teaching communities to overcome their historical roots of distrust and initiating the 
long yet rewarding journey of social capital accumulation.  
Another fascinating avenue for future research on social capital goes beyond the COVID-
19 pandemic. There are many different kinds of crises, and a health crisis induced by a violently 
contagious disease is only one example. Even though all crises demand assertive government 
 
245 Personal Interview with Campanian Government Officials. 
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responses, some crises operate in different ways. For instance, unlike the COVID-19 pandemic, 
which required swift action from public health services, a housing market crash requires decisive 
responses from public financial services. By investigating other crisis variants through the lens of 
social capital, scholars can further analyze the relationship between the civic community and 
crisis policy responses.  
Conclusion 
 This thesis has attempted to address the complex question of what role social capital 
played in determining Italy’s regional government policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The 2020 pandemic was a unique situation in and of itself, but in Italy’s specific case, the 
circumstances surrounding the nation’s first fight against coronavirus were especially intriguing. 
Unlike policymakers from other western democratic nations, Italy’s government officials had no 
viable policy guide to use when the virus emerged in full force in mid-February 2020. Following 
the example of Putnam’s examination of Italy’s decentralized government, a study of social 
capital, sub-national governance, and the first coronavirus wave seemed compelling and 
necessary. In hopes of furthering our knowledge of social capital and its general effects on 
governance, this study has revisited the birthplace of Putnam’s theory during a “once-in-a-
generation” crisis. 
           For democratic nations to endure the test of time, governments must know how to 
effectively manage intense crisis scenarios like the COVID-19 pandemic. Political science plays 
a pivotal role in producing this valuable knowledge. As this chaotic century progresses and new 
unprecedented crises brew in the future, political scientists must extract meaningful lessons from 
past crises. By studying these emergencies to the greatest possible extent, political science can 
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prepare governments and societies for the future. When another crisis eventually arrives, 
democracies will be more prepared, and more lives will be saved as a result.  
This study is an attempt to contribute to this preparation. By investigating the connection 
between social capital and governance during the COVID-19 pandemic, this study has pushed to 
enrich the general knowledge of social capital and the greater state and society relationships that 
characterize democracies. Since all democracies will eventually face a crisis, by understanding 
how social capital impacted Italian sub-national institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
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